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INTRODUCTION
Trading publicly listed securities on the open market is markedly different from
traditional face-to-face securities transactions.1 In turn, the modern-day fraud-on-the-market
securities class action bears little factual resemblance to its common-law predecessors, deceit and
misrepresentation, which provided conventional contract-based remedies for fraud in face-to-face
dealings.2 And yet, even though securities laws have detailed pleading standards and nuanced
requirements for “loss causation,” no coherent doctrinal statement exists for calculating openmarket damages in Rule 10b-5 securities fraud class actions.3 Instead, courts endeavored to
fashion common-law deceit and misrepresentation remedies to fit open-market fraud.4 The result
is a relatively ineffective system with a hallmark feature: unpredictable damage awards. This
poses a significant fraud deterrence problem from both a practical and a theoretical standpoint.
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1
The key feature of face-to-face transactions for our purposes is that the securities purchaser buys the
securities directly from the corporation or a corporate agent and are thus in privity with the corporation or corporate
agent. Consequently, these transactions differ markedly from open-market transactions where investors trade
securities with one another through the publicly traded securities market. See generally Steven A. Fishman, Duty to
Disclose under Rule 10b-5 in Face-to-Face Transactions, 12 J. CORP. L. 251, 256-57 (1987).
2
See Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1487,
1488 (1996) (“Securities class action litigation today has little in common with suits over the common law torts of
fraud and misrepresentation from which the compensatory remedy was derived.”)
3
See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REV.
611, 611 (1985). This Article’s scope is limited to Rule 10b-5 actions involving secondary market transactions.
Numerous securities class actions include claims under sections 11 and 12 of the 1933 Securities Exchange Act and
while the damages measure under section 11 is similar to Rule 10b-5 cases, this Article focuses on Rule 10b-5.
Unlike section 11 or Rule 10b-5 cases, to plead a case under section 12, plaintiffs do not have to demonstrate that
the misrepresentation or omission caused them economic harm. In re Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 1006, 1029 (9th Cir.
2005); Casella v. Webb, 883 F.2d 805, 808-09 (9th Cir. 1989); Rousseff v. E.F. Hutton Co., 867 F.2d 1281, 1282
(11th Cir. 1989).
4
Because a corporation acts only through its agents, the corporation is often required to compensate
investors for its agents’ acts. The agents themselves may not even be named in the class action and if they are, their
portion of the settlement payment will likely come from directors’ and officers’ liability insurance. Lisa M. Fairfax,
Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors’ Fiduciary Duty Through Legal Liability, 42 HOUS. L.
REV. 393, 412-13 (2005); Alexander, supra note 2, at 1498; Jennifer A. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious
Liability for Fraud on Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 699 (1992). John
Coffee, Jr. argues that to achieve optimal deterrence, agents should bear more of the costs of wrongdoing. John C.
Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation 19 (March
2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=893833. But see
Sanjai Bhagat et al., Managerial Indemnification and Liability Insurance: The Effect on Shareholder Wealth, 54J.
RISK & INS. 721, 726 (1987). Unless the Department of Justice prosecutes the agents for criminal actions, half or
more of their settlement payment will likely come from these insurance policies, which the corporation usually pays
for. See Alexander, supra note 2, at 1498.
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Though precise damage calculations generally come at the end of litigation, the legal
standard for measuring loss, and thus for calculating damages to remedy that loss, is important at
the suit’s outset to determine whether plaintiffs experienced a compensable loss for purposes of
pleading a viable securities fraud action.5 In 2005, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to
clarify what constituted a loss in the open market, which could have facilitated earlier dismissal
of cases without compensable losses. Instead, dicta in Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo6 further
confused the damage issue by (1) perpetuating the idea that courts can tailor damages from
common-law deceit and misrepresentation actions to remedy open-market fraud despite the
factual disparities between the two and (2) opening the door to a new form of hypothetical losses
where the stock price increases after an opportune disclosure of fraud.7 Although Dura
diminished plaintiffs’ ability to sue based on alleged purchase price inflation, its dicta, which
indicated that plaintiffs might be able to recover when their share prices did not increase as much
as they otherwise would have after the discovery of fraud, muddied the water with regard to what
constituted loss.
The Supreme Court’s insinuation that a new form of hypothetical losses might be
recoverable destabilizes the general notion that plaintiffs are entitled to compensation only for
their out-of-pocket losses. Usually, when a corporation discloses a previous unfavorable
misrepresentation or omission, its stock price drops. This decline indicates that the investing
public considered the information relevant. In Dura, the court implied that an investor might
recover damages when a stock’s price does not increase as much as it would have absent the
fraud.8 In other words, if a corporation bundles adverse and favorable information that causes its
stock price to increase, an investor without any net loss might be able to sue. This suggests that

5

Although a plaintiff must purchase or sell a security to have standing, she must also have experienced a
loss that results in an injury. Barr v. Matria Healthcare, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1376 (N.D. Ga. 2004); see
generally Miller v. Asenio & Co., Inc., 364 F.3d 223, 230 (4th Cir. 2004) (“Requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate the
fact of proximately caused damage to establish 10b-5 liability precludes wholly speculative claims and claims by
plaintiffs who ultimately profit from, or experience no economic pinch as a result of, the challenged transaction.”);
Wolf v. Frank, 477 F.2d 467, 478 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding that plaintiffs have standing only when they can show an
injury of the type Rule 10b-5 is intended to prevent).
6
544 U.S. 336, 343 (2005). Several commentators have discussed the impact of Dura in other respects.
See Larry E. Ribstein, Fraud on a Noisy Market, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 137, 153 (2006); John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Loss Causation After Dura: Something for Everyone, N.Y.L.J. 5 (May 19, 2005); John C. Coffee, Jr., Causation By
Presumption? Why the Supreme Court Should Reject Phantom Losses and Reverse Broudo, 60 BUS. L. J. 533
(2005).
7
Dura indicated that “private securities-fraud actions resemble in many (but not all) respects common-law
deceit and misrepresentation actions” and that litigants should examine these common-law roots to determine
whether a plaintiff suffered an injury and economic loss. Dura, 544 U.S. at 343. The Court also noted, “The same is
true in respect to a claim that a share’s higher price is lower than it would otherwise have been – a claim we do not
consider here.” Id. As John Coffee observed, “to raise this issue is to suggest that it stands on the same logical
footing as price inflation that results in a stock price decline.” Coffee, Loss Causation After Dura: Something for
Everyone, supra note 6, at 5. Even before Dura, some courts suggested in dicta that stockholders may experience an
actionable loss if stock does not appreciate as it would have absent the fraudulent conduct. Gebhardt v. ConAgra
Foods, Inc., 335 F.3d 824, 832 (8th Cir. 2003).
8
The Court noted that its reasoning in Dura could also apply to “a claim that a share’s higher price is lower
than it would otherwise have been – a claim we do not consider here.” Id. By mentioning the issue, the Court
seemed to suggest that a price increase should be taken as seriously as a traditional stock price decline. See Coffee,
Loss Causation After Dura: Something for Everyone, supra note 6, at 5.
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plaintiffs might not be limited to damages for traditional out-of-pocket losses.9 A number of
intrinsic problems could result from compensating investors for more than these losses. To cite
but one example, providing investors with a double-recovery, one from the net stock price
increase and one from class-action damages, could create a perverse incentive to invest
purposefully in companies showing signs of fraud.10
To illustrate these potential effects, consider the following situation:
“We’ve Found Gold!,” claims Corporation in a half-page press
release in the New York Times. Corporation’s stock price
increases from $10 a share to $50 a share. An investor calls her
broker and purchases ten shares at $50 per share. Three-months
later, Corporation announces in two-inch, bold, capital letters,
“We’ve Found Platinum!” Beneath the capitals, small, footnoted
text reads “but not gold.” The investor’s stock soars to $200 per
share. But she wants to recover for the inflation in her purchase
price based upon the gold misrepresentation.11
After Dura, assuming that she could meet the other elements of a claim, this investor might be
able to maintain a securities class action against Corporation even though she did not suffer outof-pocket losses.12 Although some have argued that courts should expand private litigation
remedies to deter this type of opportune disclosure,13 the better view is that courts should limit
recovery to out-of-pocket losses and recognize that private remedies need not be invariably
coextensive with enforcement by the Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”).14

9

Securities fraud cases on the open market have typically involved a decline in the stock price after the
disclosure of wrongdoing.
10
One obvious ex ante indicia of fraud includes accounting restatements. Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on
Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1465, 1499 (2004).
11
This example is adapted from the Supreme Court’s oral argument in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v.
Broudo. Transcript of Oral Argument, Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, available at 2005 WL 236546,
(Jan. 12, 2005). If the gold-platinum scenario sounds too hypothetical, consider a pharmaceutical company that
announces higher than expected profits to create a market frenzy and later issues both a revised 10K filing revealing
its past financial woes and announces that it received FDA approval for a new cancer-fighting drug.
12
This scenario is not far-fetched. The oral argument in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo
contemplates but does not resolve this scenario. Transcript of Oral Argument, Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544
U.S. 336, available at 2005 WL 236546, (Jan. 12, 2005). For another example, see In re Columbia Sec. Litig., 155
F.R.D. 466, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (observing that just because the price did not drop as a result of alleged
misrepresentations did not preclude a fraud-on-the-market claim since the misrepresentations might have prevented
a price rise that otherwise would have occurred). The court in Gebhardt v. ConAgra Foods, Inc. seems to think that
plaintiffs should be able to recover in this situation. It observed that “stockholders can be damaged in ways other
than seeing their stocks decline.” 335 F.3d at 83. “If a stock does not appreciate as it would have absent the
fraudulent conduct, investors have suffered a harm.” Id. at 832.
13
See, e.g., Merritt B. Fox, Understanding Dura, 60 BUS. LAW. 1547, 1558 (2005) (arguing that courts
should accept a variety of evidence to demonstrate price inflation and that a price drop is not necessary for
recovery).
14
Although this article is not a defense of the securities class action – particularly when investors have not
suffered from out-of-pocket losses – the securities class action has been defended in numerous circumstances. See,
e.g., James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 497 (1997).
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Private class-action litigation is problematic in the gold-platinum hypothetical because
investors were already financially advantaged when the price appreciated above the purchase
price. Yet permitting corporate agents to escape liability through opportune disclosures15
impugns the stock market’s integrity and could adversely affect the economy. Still, the option is
not between private litigation and no enforcement. Even without a private remedy, the SEC, the
Department of Justice, and the exchanges themselves can penalize corporate wrongdoing.16
Thus, limiting the availability of private class actions when investors do not experience an out-ofpocket loss does not mean that fraud would go undeterred or unpunished. Yet without a clear
doctrinal statement limiting recovery to out-of-pocket losses, the securities class action is
arguably available to recoup the inflation in the purchase price from the misleading gold
misrepresentation.
Compensating investors (who are corporate shareholders) when the net stock price
increases, injures investors by requiring them to pay significant transaction costs, such as
attorneys fees, to transfer wealth from one pocket to another.17 When investors sue a
corporation, its shareholders indirectly bear those costs. Because investors are diversified, they
may belong to the shareholder group indirectly paying for the litigation on one day and may be
in the class of investors suing a corporation on the next. Thus, in the aggregate, compensating
diversified investors when the net stock price increases is a costly means for wealth
redistribution.
Part I begins with a brief overview of securities laws to provide a contextual framework
for approaching damage awards. Part I then follows Dura’s directive to examine common-law
deceit and misrepresentation actions for guidance on economic loss and damages in modern
securities-fraud awards.18 As a result, this part also reviews courts’ criteria for awarding
common-law contract and equity-based damages to determine whether the criteria also apply to
open-market securities violations.
Part II considers normative theories justifying the private securities class action as an
enforcement tool. Even though recovering damages after plaintiffs’ experience a net gain is
problematic under the current system, perhaps the system should change if recovery further
promoted the goals of the securities class action. Yet, after analyzing compensation and
deterrence as possible goals, I conclude that compensating plaintiffs for net gains redistributes
15
Under the federal securities laws, corporations that have a duty to disclose must disclose all material
information whether it is positive or negative. This use of “disclosure” in this article implies bad news and that any
subsequent class litigation is comprised of purchasers who allege that they bought the security based on a
misrepresentation or omission.
16
Unlike private actions, the SEC need not prove injury or damage to maintain a claim. S.E.C. v. Rana
Research, Inc., 8 F.3d 1358, 1363 (9th Cir. 1993); S.E.C. v. Rind, 991 F.2d 1486, 1490 (9th Cir. 1993); ALAN R.
BROMBERG & LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, BROMBERG AND LOWENFELS ON SECURITIES FRAUD AND COMMODITIES
FRAUD § 9:1 (2003).
17
See infra pages 23-24 and accompanying footnotes.
18
Securities fraud damages have long vexed courts. See, e.g., Robert B. Thompson, Symposium,
“Simplicity and Certainty” in the Measure of Recovery Under Rule 10b-5, 51 BUS. LAW. 1177, 1179 (1996). Two
suggestions in Dura could increase unpredictability in awarding damages and thereby decrease deterrence. First,
Dura hints that plaintiffs might be able to sue when a security’s higher trading price is lower than it might have been
absent the fraud. Second, Dura observes that private securities fraud class actions resemble common-law deceit and
misrepresentation actions – which permitted damages apart from out-of-pocket losses.
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wealth among diversified shareholders (minus significant transaction costs) and may cause
perverse effects on investor education and motivation. Instead, deterrence is the most
substantiated rationale for private recovery. Nevertheless, without defining a criterion for
awarding damages, the unpredictable nature of remedies in private class actions may decrease
deterrence. To foster optimal deterrence, courts need a defined method for calculating openmarket damages. Part III proposes that this method limit recovery to out-of-pocket losses and
thus compensate only net losers from the fraud. This part also identifies and discusses the
practical and theoretical ramifications of restricting recovery to investors who experienced a net
out-of-pocket loss.
My inquiry throughout this Article focuses exclusively on open-market damages for
securities fraud in class action lawsuits; I do not advocate changing damage measures for face-toface transactions or for more traditional nonclass suits. This Article takes for granted that the
SEC, the Department of Justice, and the exchanges coexist with private litigation to deter fraud,
that private class-based litigation can deter fraud with appropriate damage restrictions in place,
that it is (sometimes) desirable to enforce Rule 10b-5 against non-issuing corporate defendants,
and that courts will continue to use the fraud-on-the-market theory at least for awhile despite
numerous academic challenges to the efficient capital markets hypothesis. These assumptions
are subject to ongoing debate, but they are beyond the scope of this Article’s focus on
determining (a) whether the system should compensate investors through private actions when
their stock price does not increase as much as it would have absent fraud and (b) whether limiting
investors to their out-of-pocket losses in this regard could bolster fraud deterrence.
I. MEASURING DAMAGES FROM OPEN MARKET LOSS
The appropriate method for calculating economic loss and awarding damages for openmarket fraud has long proved problematic for courts.19 In all private securities fraud litigation,
class actions or otherwise, damages are an essential prerequisite for maintaining a claim.20 Yet,
because securities fraud class-action cases generally settle before courts calculate damages,
opinions are scarce.21 Accordingly, this section begins with a brief securities laws overview to
contextualize the purpose of private remedies.

19

See Thompson, supra note 18, at 1179 (“The measure of recovery in a Rule 10b-5 action always has been
confusing. Not coincidentally, it always has been an afterthought in Rule 10b-5 case law. Litigants seeking to
establish the existence and the elements of a private cause of action under Rule 10b-5 were content to leave the
measure of recovery to be resolved another day.”).
20
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2006); Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342 (2005).
21
Miller v. Asensio & Co., Inc., 364 F.3d 223 (4th Cir. 2004) (“The treatises note the ‘relative paucity of
decisions’ dealing with damages in Rule 10b-5 cases.”) (quoting THOMAS L. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES
REGULATION § 12.12, at 528 (2002)); 3 ALAN R. BLOOMBERG & LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, BLOOMBERG & LOWENFELS
ON SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD, § 9.1, at 9.10.14 n. 6 (2003); Daniel P. Lefler et al., Just How Much
Damage Did Those Misrepresentations Actually Cause and To Whom?: Damages Measurement in “Fraud on the
Market” Securities Class Actions, 1505 PLI/Corp 285, 289 (2005); Thompson, supra note 18, at 1179; Donald C.
Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 639, 648 (1996); Bradford
Cornell & R. Gregory Morgan, Using Finance Theory to Measure Damages in Fraud on the Market Cases, 37
UCLA L. REV. 883, 884 (1990).
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A. Contextualizing Securities Laws to Provide a Framework to Understand Damage Awards
As early as 1975, the Supreme Court recognized that the securities class action “presents
a danger of vexatiousness different in degree and in kind from that which accompanies litigation
in general.”22 Consequently, during the 1990s, Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”)23 to rein in prolific use of the 193324 and 193425 Exchange Acts.
In passing the PSLRA, Congress stated that private securities litigation was “an
indispensable tool with which defrauded investors can recover their losses.”26 But it also
observed that the class action device, as then used in securities litigation, injured “the entire U.S.
economy.”27 The Act’s supporters alleged that class-action lawyers filed frivolous complaints28
and targeted deep-pocket defendants,29 which produced blackmail settlements,30 discouraged
qualified people from serving on boards of directors, and placed heavy economic burdens on
both corporations and the economy as a whole.31
As a result of these arguments, Title I of the PSLRA limits recoverable damages and
attorneys’ fees, creates a “safe harbor” for forward-looking statements,32 requires sanctions for
frivolous litigation,33 and provides a mechanism to stay discovery pending a judicial review of a
motion to dismiss.34 The limit on recoverable damages entitles plaintiffs to receive only the
22

Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). Certainly not everyone believed that
securities class actions caused all of the pernicious effects that the proponents of the PSLRA and SLUSA attributed
to them. See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest, Why Disimply?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 727, 743-44 (1995).
23
15 U.S.C. § 77z-1, 78u. The PSLRA has been criticized for making it more difficult to bring class
actions in general rather than weeding out the nonmeritorious ones. See, e.g., See A.C. Prichard, Markets as
Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions with Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925,
960 (1999) (“But the procedural obstacles of the Reform Act do not screen out only frivolous suits: Instead, the
Reform Act makes it harder to bring class actions, whatever their individual merit.”).
24
15 U.S.C. § 77a (2006).
25
15 U.S.C. § 78a.
26
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 126 S.Ct. 1503, 1509 (2006) (quoting the House
Conference Report, 109 Stat. 737).
27
H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995).
28
See Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 308 (2d Cir. 2000) (“Legislators were apparently motivated in large
part by a perceived need to deter strike suits wherein opportunistic private plaintiffs file securities fraud claims of
dubious merit in order to extract large settlement recoveries.”).
29
H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995).
30
For a discussion of the general theory of blackmail in the class action setting, see L. Elizabeth Chamblee,
Unsettling Efficiency: When Non-Class Aggregation of Mass Torts Creates Second-Class Settlements, 65 LA. L.
REV. 157, 222 (2004).
31
Id.; S. Rep. No. 98, 104th Cong, 1st Sess. 8-10 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679.
32
“Deterrence is further undermined by the safe harbor that the Reform Act creates for forward-looking
statements. The safe harbor immunizes such statements if they were not knowingly false when made, a departure
from the ordinary standard of recklessness.” Prichard, supra note 23, at 962.
33
15 U.S.C. § 78v-4(c) (2006); see also Choi, supra note 10, at 1469-74.
34
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4; see also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 126 S.Ct. 1503, 1511
(2006); Felton v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 2006 WL 1149184, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2006). Some
have observed that these reforms crippled the securities class action and undermined its application to, for example,
forward looking statements. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 14, at 497 (defending the securities class action on both
deterrent and compensatory grounds). Others have argued that the PSLRA may chill meritorious actions just as
much as it does frivolous actions. See, e.g., Hillary Sale, Heightened Pleadings and Discovery Stays: An Analysis of
the Effect of the PSLRA’s Internal-Information Standard on ’33 and ’34 Act Claims, 76 WASH. U. L. Q. 537, 537-38
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difference between the sale price of the security and the security’s mean price over a ninety-day
period following disclosure of the information.35 Title I also mandates heightened pleading
requirements for §10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims that require plaintiffs to specify each misleading
statement and to provide particular facts showing that the defendant acted with the required state
of mind.36 Even though Congress has demonstrated a steadfast commitment to insuring market
integrity, most of its reforms have erected barriers to class action recovery.
Stringent pleading requirements are one of the principal barriers to private recovery.
Plaintiffs must allege the following elements to state a claim for cases involving publicly traded
securities: (1) a material misrepresentation or omission; (2) scienter; (3) a connection with the
purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance; (5) economic loss; (6) loss causation.37 For loss
causation and standing purposes, plaintiffs must allege an injury to a legally protected interest
and a causal relationship between the injury (the economic loss) and the defendant’s conduct.38
Defendant’s conduct must, therefore, proximately cause plaintiffs’ loss.39
Causation has two components: transactional causation and loss causation.40 Because
many individuals turn their finances over to investment brokers and might not be aware of a
misstatement (or omission), much less have relied on it, plaintiffs may plead transactional

(1998). The problem is that many times the use of discovery is the only way that plaintiffs can find viable facts to
plead a strong inference of wrongdoing. See Prichard, supra note 23, at 961; Jordan Eth & Michael Dicke, Insider
Stock Sales in Rule 10b-5 Corporate Disclosure Cases: Separating the Innocent From the Suspicious, 1 STAN. J.L.
BUS. & FIN. 97, 105 (1994).
35
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2)(1), (2). Still, this leaves open the possibility of recovery insinuated by Dura, that a
plaintiff might recover when the price does not increase as much as it otherwise would have.
36
Dabit, 126 S.Ct. at 1511 (quoting Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345 (2005) (internal
citations omitted)). Professors Grundfest and Prichard have commented on the legislative ambiguity of “strong
inference” in their 2002 Stanford Law Review article. Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Prichard, Statutes with Multiple
Personality Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627
(2002). The “strong inference” standard first appeared in Senate Bill 240. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995, S. 240, 104th Cong. § 36(b) (1995).
37
Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342 (2005).
38
With regard to loss causation, “the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving that the act or omission of
the defendant alleged to violate this chapter caused the loss for which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages.” 15
U.S.C. §78u-4(b)(4) (2006); see also Barr v. Matria Healthcare, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1376 (N.D. Ga. 2004);
Gaines v. Guidant Corp., 2004 WL 2538374, *18 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 8, 2004) (quoting Lee v. City of Chicago, 330
F.3d 456, 468 (7th Cir. 2003); Packer v. Yampol, 630 F. Supp. 1237, 1240 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); see also Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992); Pasley v. Freeman, 3 T.R. 5:1, 100 Eng. Rep. 450, 457 (1789) (if
“no injury is occasioned by the lie, it is not actionable: but if it be attended with a damage it then becomes the
subject of an action.”). In securities fraud litigation under Rule 10b-5, the PSLRA includes an “additional”
requirement that the plaintiff prove that the defendant’s act or omission “caused the loss for which the plaintiff seeks
to recover damages.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4).
39
Theoharous v. Fong, 256 F.3d 1219, 1224 (11th Cir. 2001). Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 forbids (1) the “use or employ[ment]” of any “deceptive device,” (2) “in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security,” and (3) “in contravention of” Securities and Exchange Commission “rules and regulations.”
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). Binder v. Gillespie, 184 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 1999); Friedlander v. Troutman, Sanders,
Lockerman & Ashmore, 788 F.2d 1500, 1503 n. 3 (11th Cir.1986) (quoting Diamond v. Lamotte, 709 F.2d 1419,
1422-23 (11th Cir. 1983)) (citations omitted); see also Ross v. Bank South, N.A., 885 F.2d 723, 728 (11th Cir.
1989) (en banc); In re Healthsouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.R.D. 447, 458 (N.D. Ala. 2003).
40
Robbins v. Koger Props., Inc. 116 F.3d 1441, 1448 (11th Cir. 1997); see, e.g., Emergent Capital Inv.
Mgmt. v. Stonepath Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2003).

8

causation by alleging “fraud-on-the-market” if the market is “efficient.”41 The fraud-on-themarket theory establishes a rebuttable presumption that investors rely on material representations
made to the public in determining whether to buy or sell a particular security.42 Thus, the theory
satisfies both reliance and transaction causation.43 To satisfy the second causation component,
loss causation, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant “caused the loss for which the
plaintiff seeks to recover damages.”44 And yet, even though they are interrelated, there is a
distinction between loss causation, economic loss, and damages. As measured by the out-ofpocket rule, damages compensate plaintiffs only for losses actually caused by a
misrepresentation or omission.45 So, plaintiffs must demonstrate that the defendant’s
misrepresentation or omission caused the loss for which they seek to recover damages.46
B. Dura’s Potential Impact on Remedies
The few opinions available on open-market damages generally limit plaintiffs’ recovery
to out-of-pocket losses; yet, the damage issue has been subject to ongoing debate in the lower
courts. The Supreme Court had the occasion to end this debate in Dura but opted to issue a
narrow opinion instead. This section briefly examines Dura, both in terms of what the decision
did and did not do, and aims to move beyond the current confusion over damages through
exploring its sources.
In Dura, the plaintiffs alleged that Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. made false statements
about its profits and about the Food and Drug Administration’s (“FDA”) likely approval of its
asthmatic spray device. When Dura later disclosed that its earnings would not be as high as
expected due to slow drug sales, its shares lost almost one-half of their value. Eight months
later, when it announced that the FDA would not approve the device, its market price fell again

41

Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 224 (1988). For an explanation of how Basic fits into the
subsequent work of behavioral finance researchers, see Ribstein, supra note 6, at 148-50.
Academics have repeatedly challenged the validity of the efficient market theory. Although academic
debate over market efficiency continues, as Donald Langevoort observes, the fraud-on-the-market theory can be
justified regardless of whether markets are efficient. Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock
Markets: A Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 135, 154 (2002) (citing Donald C.
Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851,
876-86 (1992)).
42
See Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 178-79 (3d Cir. 2000); In re Salomon Analyst
Metromedia, 2006 WL 1716873 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2006); O’Neil v. Appel, 165 F.R.D. 479, 500 (W.D. Mich.
1996); In re Phillips Petroleum Sec. Litig., 738 F. Supp. 825, 836 (D. Del. 1990). Some have argued that the loss
causation element makes no sense in fraud-on-the-market transactions because the injury flows directly from the
misstatement. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 13, at 1549-50. This oversimplifies the issue. As we have seen, when a
misrepresentation fails to produce economic damage, but the stock price declines because of market conditions, then
a plaintiff should not able to recover. The misstatement was (a) not material as evidenced by a lack of market
response and (b) not the product of the later loss. To hold otherwise is to provide investor insurance for tough
market conditions.
43
Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005); Basic, 485 U.S. at 241; Robbins v. Koger
Props., Inc., 116 F.3d 1441, 1448 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Edward A. Dyl, Estimating Economic Damages in Class
Action Securities Fraud Litigation, J. FORENSIC ECON. 12(1), at 1 (1999).
44
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2006).
45
Robbins v. Koger Props., Inc., 116 F.3d 1441, 1447 n. 5 (11th Cir. 1997).
46
Id.
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but recovered within a week. Even though stock price recovered quickly, plaintiffs argued that
they suffered a loss by paying artificially inflated prices for Dura’s stock.47
Although a number of commentators anticipated a decision that plaintiffs could not plead
loss causation without demonstrating a decline in stock value and thus a net loss,48 the Court’s
decision settled only one issue: that a plaintiff who alleged and established that the defendant
made a materially false statement had not done enough to establish loss causation without
connecting the loss to the misrepresentation.49 This holding may change the way that
corporations reveal adverse information. For example, after Dura, the corporation may bundle
adverse and favorable information, as in the gold-platinum hypothetical, in order to prevent a
stock price decline.50
The Court also recognized that intervening factors could cause a lower price instead of
the misrepresentation, but then it added in dicta: “The same is true in respect to a claim that a
share’s higher price is lower than it would otherwise have been – a claim we do not consider
here.”51
The Court then reemphasized the importance of common-law deceit and
misrepresentation actions in deciphering economic loss and damages.52
C. The Evolution of Securities Fraud Damages
Even though modern-day securities fraud shares some elements with common-law deceit
and misrepresentation actions, courts applying the common law dealt primarily with non-liquid
markets and face-to-face transactions. Moreover, because of these differences, courts did not
limit common-law damages to out-of-pocket losses.53 Instead, they fashioned awards out of
numerous damage theories including the benefit-of-the-bargain rule,54 the out-of-pocket rule,55
47

Dura, 544 U.S. at 340. This type of allegation did not adequately plead loss causation because a
purchaser could quickly sell the shares before the relevant truth began to leak out. Thus, a seller’s alleged
misrepresentation (and its associated inflated price) did not invariably lead to a loss, but might mean a later loss.
Accordingly, loss causation limits a plaintiff’s recovery for out-of-pocket damages when the loss caused by the
fraud is actually less than the out-of-pocket measure. See id.
48
See, e.g., Coffee, Loss Causation After Dura: Something for Everyone, supra note 6, at 5.
49
Fox, supra note 13, at 1548.
50
John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation: New Doctrine Spawns New Tactics, N.Y.L.J. 5 (May 18, 2006, col. 1).
51
Dura, 544 U.S. at 343.
52
Id. As John Coffee observed, “to raise this issue is to suggest that it stands on the same logical footing as
price inflation that results in a stock price decline.” Coffee, Loss Causation After Dura: Something for Everyone,
supra note 6, at 5.
53
The elements for common-law fraud are similar to the elements for pleading securities fraud. At
common-law, the plaintiff had to demonstrate by “clear and decisive proof” “that the defendant has made a
representation in regard to a material fact”; “that such representation is false”; “that such representation was not
actually believed by the defendant, on reasonable grounds, to be true”; “that it was made with intent that it should be
acted on”; “that it was acted on by complainant to his damage; and, “that in so acting on it the complainant was
ignorant of its falsity, and reasonably believed it to be true”. So. Dev. Co. of Nevada v. Silva, 125 U.S. 247, 250
(1888). This case was cited by the Supreme Court in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. at 343.
54
See, e.g., Osofsky v. Zipf, 645 F.2d 107, 114 (2d Cir. 1981). But see Smith v. Bolles, 132 U.S. 125
(1889). In Smith v. Bolles the Supreme Court rejected the benefit-of-the-bargain rule because it included the
“expected fruits of an unrealized speculation.” It reasoned that when the asserted facts created only “speculation”
they were not material. For a discussion of this case see Michael J. Kaufman, No Foul, No Harm: The Real
Measure of Damages Under Rule 10b-5, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 29, 35-36 (1989).
55
See, e.g., Levine v. Seilon, Inc., 439 F.2d 328, 334 (2d Cir. 1971) (“Under the ‘general’ laws regime of
Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 10 (1842), the rule in the federal courts was that a defrauded buyer of securities is entitled
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disgorgement,56 and rescission.57 One commentator noted that the cases contain “a mélange of
rules” and that “all too often a court will give up and announce that the district court has
discretion to fashion ‘a remedy to suit the particular case’ – as if there were no need for legal
rules to evaluate the significance and effects of the facts of ‘the particular case.’”58 Nevertheless,
given the potential for Dura to affect class damages in new ways, this section traces the
development from common-law deceit and misrepresentation remedies to remedies for face-toface transactions to open-market fraud. It then explains why some of these common-law
principles do not hold true for modern fraud-on-the-market actions.
(1) Common-Law Origins of Confusion
In the early 1600s, deceit claims existed only for what is today termed a breach of
warranty. In the seminal common-law damages case, Chandelor v. Lopus, the Exchequer
Chamber reversed the Kings Bench’s judgment in the plaintiff’s favor because no breach of
warranty occurred – the defendant never warranted that the object in question was a “bezoar
stone.”59 Yet at least some justices believed that the defendant’s intent to deceive was actionable
even without a warranty.60 This line of thinking continued to develop through the years, and by
the late eighteenth century, the law was relatively well-established that (1) if there was an
express or implied warranty, the seller could be liable if the product did not conform to the
warranty’s specifications and (2) if no warranty existed, the seller could be liable only where she
made a false statement, knew of its falsity, and intended to deceive the buyer.61
Of course, a breach of warranty action is founded in contract law; deceit is a tort.
Though the difference initially appears to be either the presence or absence of a warranty, this
simplistic distinction caused multiple procedural and pleading issues since plaintiffs often
to recover only the excess of what he paid over the value of what he got, not, as some other courts had held, the
difference between the value of what he got and what it was represented he would be getting.”).
56
See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972) (“In our view, the
correct measure of damages under s 28 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. s 78bb(a), is the difference between the fair value of all
that the mixed-blood seller received and the fair value of what he would have received had there been no fraudulent
conduct, except for the situation where the defendant received more than the seller’s actual loss. In the latter case
damages are the amount of the defendant’s profit.”) (internal citations omitted).
57
See, e.g., Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc., 570 F.2d 38, (2d Cir. 1978). But see Green v.
Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1342 (9th Cir. 1975) (Sneed, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the result in part) (“The rescissory measure of damages does not properly measure that loss. The reason is that it
permits a defrauded purchaser to place upon the defendant the burden of any decline in the value of the stock
between the date of purchase and the date of disclosure of the fraud even though only a portion of that decline may
have been proximately caused by the defendant’s wrong.”). As to the different types of damages, see W. PAGE
KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 110 (1984);
Kaufman, supra note 54, at 30.
58
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 3, at 612 (quoting Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1121 (10th
Cir. 1982)).
59
79 Eng. Rep. 3-4, Cro. Jac. 4, Eng. Ct. Exch. 1603; Paula J. Dalley, The Law of Deceit, 1790-1860:
Continuity Amidst Change, 39 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 405, 412 (1995). A bezoar stone is a sort of stone found in the
intestine of hooved animals that was believed to be a universal antidote against poisons. Unfortunately, the case of
Chandelor v. Lopus does not explain how the buyer realized that the bezoar stone did not work.
60
Lopus v. Chandler (K.B. 1606), reprinted in J.H. BAKER & S.F.C. MILSOM, SOURCES OF ENGLISH LEGAL
HISTORY, PRIVATE LAW TO 1750, 521 (1986).
61
Dalley, supra note 59, at 413; see also Stuart v. Wilkins, 99 E.R. 15, 1 Dougl. 18 (K.B. 1778).
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hedged their bets by alleging both breach of warranty and deceit.62 Hence, in common-law deceit
and misrepresentation actions, the court chose among a buffet of remedies.63 Depending upon
the circumstances, a common-law claim for deceit could prompt the following counts in a
complaint: (1) breach of warranty and breach of contract – requesting benefit-of-the-bargain, or
“expectation” damages, to restore the plaintiff to the position she would have been in with the
defendant’s contractual performance;64 (2) misrepresentation – a tort – which could provide
recoupment for out-of-pocket losses; and (3) unjust enrichment – an equitable claim – which
might require the defendant to return the illicit profit from the transaction or rescind the
transaction altogether.65
(2) Remedies for Fraudulent Face-to-Face Transactions
Over the years, courts blurred the distinct remedies for these multiple causes of action,
which contributed to modern-day confusion over the appropriate remedy for open-market
securities fraud.66 Still, the courts did not move directly from common-law deceit and
misrepresentation into open-market fraud. They first applied common-law remedies to face-toface transactions and typically awarded either recessionary damages based upon the defendant’s
gain or out-of-pocket damages based upon the plaintiff’s loss.67
The out-of-pocket measure, which originated in tort law,68 requires the defendant to
return the losses she proximately caused. Thus, this measure only reimburses plaintiffs who
were economically harmed by the defendant’s misconduct.69 In securities fraud, these damages
compensate plaintiffs for “the difference between the price paid and the ‘real’ value of the
62

See Bartholomew v. Bushnell, 20 Conn. 271 (1850); Dalley, supra note 59, at 414-15 (“The best course,
from the plaintiff’s point of view, would be to raise both claims and hope that, at trial, he would be able to prove
either warranty or intent. The plaintiff could accomplish this maneuver by bringing one writ and offering evidence
of both kinds, or by joining the two actions.”).
63
Thompson, supra note 18, at 1184; Robert B. Thompson, The Measure of Recovery Under Rule 10b-5: A
Restitution Alternative to Tort Damages, 37 VAND. L. REV. 349, 353-54 (1984).
64
Note, however, that the Uniform Commercial Code does not recognize an implied warranty with regard
to securities. See U.C.C. § 2-105(1), 8-306(2).
65
See, e.g., Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir. 1965); see also Thompson, supra note 63, at 35354.
66
The break-down between separate and distinct causes of action may have simply been confusion. As
Dalley observes, “[i]n Waters v. Mattingly, 4 Ky. 244, 246 (1808), Judge Edwards clearly understood the difference
between the requirement of warranty and the requirement of sciens, but unfortunately he thought the distinction
arose from the distinction between a suppression veri and a suggestion falsi.” Dalley, supra note 59, at 41 n. 36.
67
See Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 358-59 (1986); Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United
States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972) (note, however, that this is not a fraud-on-the-market case); Jordan v. Duff &
Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 441-42 (7th Cir. 1987); Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Ellis, 810 F.2d 700, 706-07 (7th Cir.
1987) (“In an action under § 10(b), the plaintiff cannot take advantage of the recessionary remedies provided
elsewhere in the securities laws. . . . Sometimes remedies under the securities laws are based on defendants’ gain
rather than plaintiffs’ loss, or plaintiff may have an election.”).
68
Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), was the first case to invoke tort principles
for an implied right of action under rule 10b-5. Judge Kilpatrick’s decision in Kardon was “adopted by an
‘overwhelming consensus of the District Courts and Courts of Appeals.” Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc. v. Dabit, 126 S.Ct. 1503, 1509 (2006) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730
(1975)). The Second Circuit later limited the breadth of the Rule 10b-5 private action in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel
Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952).
69
Kaufman, supra note 54, at 129-30.
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security, i.e., the fair market value absent the misrepresentations, at the time of the initial
purchase.”70 The “real value,” or “true value” as it is often termed, means the price absent the
fraud.71 Accordingly, courts often determine whether the investor was a net winner or a net loser
from the fraud.72 Under the out-of-pocket theory, an investor with net monetary gains has no
damage and cannot recover.73 It follows then that an investor who realized more than her initial
investment – as in the gold-platinum hypothetical – could not recover.
In face-to-face transactions, courts also awarded common-law remedies based on contract
law and equity. The frequency of these awards increased after Judge Aldrich’s opinion in
Janigan v. Taylor.74 Judge Aldrich thought disgorgement was appropriate because it was better
“to give the defrauded party the benefit even of windfalls than to let the fraudulent party keep
them.”75 Therefore, courts reasoned that they should not treat one who committed fraud any

70

Robbins v. Koger Props., Inc., 116 F.3d 1441, 1447 n. 5 (11th Cir. 1997) (internal citation omitted); see
also Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436-37 (9th Cir. 1987); Sirota v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 673
F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1982); Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 587 (3d Cir. 1981); Green v. Occidental Petroleum
Corp., 541 F.2d 1355, 1344-46 (9th Cir. 1976) (concurring opinion); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 908-09 (9th
Cir. 1975). The out-of-pocket measure is the most common in calculating damages in securities fraud class actions.
Blackie, 524 F.2d at 908-09.
71
Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 661-62 (1986); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S.
128, 155 (1972); Mathews v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc., 260 F.3d 239, 249 (3d Cir. 2001); Ambassador Hotel
Co., Ltd. v. Wei-Chuan Inv., 189 F.3d 1017, 1030 (9th Cir. 1999); Alexander, supra note 2, at 1491; Thompson,
supra note 18, at 1181. The difficulty with the out-of-pocket measure is that no simple means exists for determining
the value on the day of the transaction. Thompson, supra note 18, at 1180. Further, some courts have used the value
of the stock on a day other than the day that the transaction occurred, such as when the defendant disclosed the
correction. See, e.g., Harris v. Am. Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220, 226 (8th Cir. 1975); Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d
35, 43-44 (10th Cir. 1971); Esplin v. Hirsch, 402 F.2d 94, 104-05 (10th Cir. 1968). It is the plaintiffs’ burden to
provide evidence of the “true value” for each date during the class period. Sowell v. Butcher & Singer, Inc., 926
F.2d 289, 297 (3d Cir. 1991). Consequently, this modified measure could increase plaintiffs’ damage calculation by
including market changes such as a declining market rather than only loss from the fraud. Thompson, supra note
18, at 1191.
72
See, e.g., In re Cardinal Health, Inc. Sec. Litig., 226 F.R.D. 298, 308 (S.D. Ohio 2005); In re Comdisco
Sec. Litig., 150 F. Supp. 2d 943 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (determining that a pension fund was “out of the running for
designation of lead plaintiff” since it “derived a net gain of almost $300,000 . . . from its purchases and sales during
the Class Period”); In re McKesson HBOC, Inc. Sec. Litig., 97 F. Supp. 2d 993, 996-97 (N.D. Ca. 1999) (rejecting
the net seller as lead plaintiff and observing that a net purchaser might have more interest in the litigation because it
was induced by the fraud to purchase shares and was left “holding the bag” when the fraud was revealed).
73
See, e.g., Arenson v. Broadcom Corp., 2004 WL 3253646 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2004) (granting defendants’
motion for summary judgment as to plaintiffs who benefited from the alleged inflation); see also Fox, supra note 13,
at 1553 (noting that if the price increased, “application of the loss causation rule developed in the context of a
traditional reliance-based action would bar recovery” because it “required that the purchased security decline in
value from what was paid (or was sold at a loss)” and that the decline is “reasonably related to the falsity of the
statement that induced the purchase”).
74
344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir. 1965).
75
Id.; see also Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 663 (1986) (citing Janigan, 344 F.2d at 786); Rude v.
Campbell Square, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 1040, 1050 (D.S.D. 1976). In Janigan, the defendant, who was president,
general manager, and director of Boston Electro Steel Casting, Inc, purchased stock from his shareholders without
telling them that the corporation was going through a revitalization. After two years, the stock’s value multiplied.
The court reasoned that if it awarded the difference between the market price of the stock at the time of the sale and
the price paid to plaintiffs, the damages would have been minimal. Instead, the court rationalized that the fair value
of the stock when sold was not the market price, but the market price of what the stock would have been if the
market knew what the defendant knew.
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better than a defendant who only breached a contract.76 And so, depending on what justice
required, they began to use benefit-of-the-bargain awards, rescission, and disgorgement as
remedies.77
The benefit-of-the-bargain remedy is based in contract law and compensates plaintiffs for
the amount they would have received, including profits, if the defendant performed as
promised.78 Both rescission and disgorgement79 are equitable remedies that are also used in
contract law. As applied to face-to-face securities fraud cases, courts have required defendants
to disgorge, or return, their unjust enrichment so that the plaintiff recovers the fraudulently
obtained profit.80 Rescissory damages aim to rescind the transaction and to put the plaintiff in
the same position she would have occupied if the transaction never occurred.81 These damages
require that the defendant pay not only for the fraud but also for the change in market
conditions.82 So, in the process of undoing a securities transaction, the plaintiff avoids both the
harm from the fraud as well as the danger of failing market conditions.83 Requiring the
76

See, e.g., United States v. Ben Grunstein & Sons, Co., 137 F. Supp. 197, 208-10 (D.N.J. 1956); Stout v.
Martin, 104 S.E. 157 (W. Va. 1920).
77
Ben Grunstein & Sons, Co., 137 F. Supp. at 208-10; Stout, 104 S.E. at 157. Both the courts and the drafters of the
Restatement of Torts recognized that benefit-of-the-bargain damages were preferable in fraud actions particularly
when the out-of-pocket measure did not afford “just and satisfactory” compensation. Id. Courts agreed with this
rationale. See, e.g., Osofsky v. Zipf, 645 F.2d 107 (C.A.N.Y. 1981); William Prosser, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS § 110, at 733-34 (1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 549(2), cmt. on (2) (1977).
78
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
79
Disgorgement is “[t]he act of giving up something (such as profits illegally obtained) on demand or by
legal compulsion.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). In this context, disgorgement aims to prevent
wrongdoers from unjustly enriching themselves, not to compensate victims. S.E.C. v. Cavanagh, 445 F.3d 105, 117
(2d Cir. 2006); S.E.C. v. Tome, 833 F.2d 1086, 1096 (2d Cir. 1987) (“[T]he primary purpose of disgorgement is not
to compensate investors.”); S.E.C. v. Blavin, 760 F.2d 706, 713 (6th Cir. 1985).
80
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972). “The primary purpose of
disgorgement orders is to deter violations of the securities laws by depriving violators of their ill-gotten gains.”
S.E.C. v. Fischbach Corp., 133 F.3d 170, 175 (2d Cir. 1997). Although these funds are often used to compensate
victims of the wrongdoing, the goal of compensation is secondary to that of deterrence. Id.; see also S.E.C. v.
Commonwealth Chem. Securities, Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 102 (2d Cir. 1978).
81
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). Merritt Fox has argued that rescissory damages should be
used for securities fraud cases. Merritt B. Fox, Demystifying Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market Actions, 60 BUS.
LAW. 507, 512-13 (2005).
82
Thompson, supra note 18, at 1183. This remedy is “rooted in the contract of sale” and as Judge Joseph
Sneed believed:
This remedy imposes upon the wrongful seller the burden of any loss in the
value of the stock between the date of sale and the disclosure date. This is
appropriate because the wrongful seller as a direct consequence of his wrong
shifted to the purchaser the risks the seller would have borne but for the
wrongful sale. The seller’s obligation is to accept the return of the risk he
wrongfully shifted in the contract of sale. That is, it springs from his contractual
undertaking.
Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1343 (9th Cir. 1976) (Sneed, J. concurring).
83
Thompson, supra note 18, at 1182-83. Some courts have even applied a rescissionary measure for open
market situations. See, e.g., U.S. v. Grabske, 260 F. Supp. 2d 866 (N.D. Cal. 2002). The Grabske court pondered
how they might apply rescissionary damages as follows:
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defendant to bear the risk of market decline differentiates rescissory damages from out-of-pocket
damages, which seek to isolate the price due to fraud and permit recovery only for that
difference.84 Although this rationale makes sense as applied to face-to-face transactions where
the plaintiff sells stock that skyrockets in value after the sale and the defendant acquires the stock
by fraud, it does not hold true for secondary open-market transactions.85
(3) Remedies for Fraud-on-the-Market
In face-to-face transactions, the wrongdoer’s obligation to accept the returned risk of
failing market conditions is founded in the sale contract.86 In the open-market situation, on the
other hand, the corporate defendant does not sell anything directly to the plaintiff.87 Instead, the
plaintiff purchases stock from others on the open market and the corporate defendant’s

Assuming a sale and purchase of stock, true rescission would involve a return,
on the one hand, of the purchase price and, on the other hand, of the stock
purchased. In an open market setting the injured party “returns the stock” by
selling it on the open market. The defendant “returns the purchase price” by
compensating the injured party for any difference between the price that the
injured party paid for the security and its trading price following the disclosure
of the fraud.
Id. at 872 (internal citations omitted). Given the nature of the loss causation requirement after Dura, it stands to
reason that private plaintiffs should no longer be permitted to recover rescissory damages. See infra Part III.A.1.
84
See Doyle v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 59 P.2d 1171 (Mont. 1936); Poole v. Camden, 92 S.E. 454 (W.
Va. 1916); Beare v. Wright, 103 N.W. 632, 634 (N.D. 1905); Thompson, supra note 18, at 1182-83.
85
See Kaufman, supra note 54, at 43-44. Accordingly, a growing number of courts refuse to award
rescissionary damages in section 10(b) cases. See, e.g., Mathews v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc., 260 F.3d 239, 249
(3d Cir. 2001) (“[I]n most §10(b) cases, we are extremely hesitant to award rescissionary damages and instead apply
an ‘out of pocket measure.’”); Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., Inc., 903 F.2d 186, 203 n. 25 (3d Cir. 1990)
(“Although the Supreme Court has reserved the question whether a rescissionary measure of damages is ever
appropriate for defrauded buyers under Rule 10b-5, this court has expressed clear disapproval of a damage theory
that would insure defrauded buyers against downside market risk unrelated to fraud.”); Huddleston v. Hearman &
MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 555 (5th Cir. 1981), modified on other grounds, 459 U.S. 375 (1983). The Fifth Circuit
explained its reasoning as follows:
[T]he rescissional measure permits the defrauded securities buyer to place upon
the defendant the burden of any decline in the value of the securities between the
date of purchase and the date of sale even though only a portion of that decline
may have been proximately caused by the defendant’s wrong . . . . Under these
circumstances, the rescissional measure is unjust insofar as it compensates an
investor for the nonspecific risks which he assumes by entering the market.
Losses thus accruing have no relation to either the benefits derived by the
defendants from the fraud or to the blameworthiness of their conduct.
Huddleston, 640 F.2d at 555.
86
See Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1343 (9th Cir. 1976) (Sneed, J., concurring).
87
See id.; Fox, supra note 13, at 1548 (“Fraud-on-the-market actions such as Dura are very different from
traditional reliance-based actions. The plaintiff in a traditional reliance-based action is typically a purchaser
involved in either a face-to-face transaction in shares of a non-publicly traded issuer or an IPO.”).
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misrepresentations do not shift the risk of loss.88 The corporation cannot return a purchase price
it never received.89
Nevertheless, enterprise liability foists most of the fraud’s cost on diversified
shareholders who are not responsible for the fraud.90 Put another way, plaintiffs generally bring
Rule 10b-5 fraud-on-the-market actions against nonissuing parties (the corporations); thus, there
is no sale contract or privity between the plaintiff and defendant.91 When there is no direct
transaction or contract between the plaintiff-investor and the corporate defendant (and thus no
privity), it makes little sense to award contract-based damages.92 Consequently, remedies of
contract rescission and rescissory damages cannot be justified on a restitution theory.93
The justification for disgorgement is likewise misplaced. Disgorgement assumes that
fraud unjustly enriched the defendant.94 But, in the open market, the plaintiff does not exchange

88

See Green, 541 F.2d at 1343; Alexander, supra note 2, at 1496; cf Thompson, supra note 63, at 386
(noting that “[r]isks of change in the market that occur within a reasonable time following the discovery of fraud
shift to the defendants, while risks of market changes after that time fall on the plaintiff”).
89
See Green, 541 F.2d at 1343; Alexander, supra note 2, at 1496. Because each purchase in the secondary
open market corresponds to a sale, just as many market participants benefit from the fraud as are damaged. See In re
Clearly Canadian Sec. Litig., 875 F. Supp. 1410, 1415 n. 3 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 3, at
635.
90
Arlen & Carney, supra note 4, at 699.
91
Ross v. Bank South, N.A., 885 F.2d 723, 743 (11th Cir. 1989) (Tjoflat, Judge, specially concurring); In
re Letterman Bros. Energy Sec. Litig., 799 F.2d 967, 972 (5th Cir. 1986); Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640
F.2d 534, 554-55 (5th Cir. 1981), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 459 U.S. 375 (1983) (“Use of the
rescissional measure is usually limited to cases involving either privity between plaintiff or defendant or some
specific fiduciary duty owed by brokers to their customers.”); Philip J. Leas, Note, The Measure of Damages in Rule
10b-5 Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 26 STAN. L. REV. 371, 376 (1974).
92
Ross, 885 F.2d at 743 (finding rescission an inappropriate remedy in a Rule 10b-5 action against nonissuing parties). Judge Tjoflat explained his thoughts that rescission is inappropriate as follows:
In a Rule 10b-5 action against non-issuing parties, courts may not grant
rescission as a remedy. Rescission is an equitable remedy that restores parties to
a transaction to their status quo ante. Typically a buyer discovers a seller’s
fraud, promptly tenders the goods to the seller, and demands the return of his
purchase price. The court then orders the seller to return the purchase price and
uses its civil contempt power to coerce the seller’s compliance with its order.
This remedy is available, however, only against parties to a contract – a court
may not order rescission in a buyer’s action against a defrauding party who is
not a party to the contract of sale. Thus, in the context of Rule 10b-5, where
buyers often sue parties that are not in privity of contract with the buyer,
rescission is unavailable.
Id.; Huddleston, 640 F.2d at 554-55; see also Thompson, supra note 18, at 1185 (“In open market transactions
when the defendants have made misleading statements to the market, the plaintiffs trade not with the defendants but
with strangers in the market. These alternative remedies are not likely to be available in that setting.”); Leas, supra
note 91, at 376.
93
Green, 541 F.2d at 1343.
94
Disgorgement plays an important deterrence role in face-to-face transactions, but does not translate into
open-market transactions. For some examples of how disgorgement operates in other securities enforcement
actions, see S.E.C. v. Gemstar-TV Guide Int’l, Inc., 401 F.2d 1031, 1047 (9th Cir. 2005). Disgorgement is generally
paid to victims of wrongdoing only when the victims can establish an equitable claim to the funds. See S.E.C. v.
Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 956 F. Supp. 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). When the proceeds of disgorgement do not go
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money directly with the corporation and the corporation does not benefit directly from that
profit.95 Thus, there is no direct unjust enrichment to disgorge.96
This is not to say that corporations never receive indirect benefits from undiscovered
open-market fraud.97 Indeed, depending upon the type of fraud, the corporation might receive
incidental tax benefits, lower costs of capital, protection from hostile takeovers, temporary
business advantages, and increased publicity, while its employees may experience increased job
security.98 In the short run, the corporation’s increased share price may provide the capital to
enter new businesses and update capital assets.99 The agent committing fraud may temporarily
benefit from higher firm share prices, job advancement, increased stock options, and increased
prestige and reputation.100 Yet all of these purported benefits are speculative and nearly
impossible to value. Even assuming a court could value them, their value is probably a good
deal less than losses of open-market purchasers.101 Consequently, if the corporation has to
compensate class members for out-of-pocket losses, this compensation should purge it of any
indirect benefits. One court observed that misstatements seldom benefit the corporate issuer and
that “chickens have a way of coming home to roost.”102 “When they do so in the form of
securities class action plaintiffs, a corporation has hell (and usually a great deal of money) to
pay.”103 In sum, even if the corporation received some incidental benefit from the initial
undiscovered fraud, out-of-pocket damages will likely suffice.

to the victims, the money should be paid into the United States Treasury. S.E.C. v. Fischbach Corp., 133 F.3d 170
(2d Cir. 1997); Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 956 F. Supp. at 503.
95
See Prichard, supra note 23, at 930-37. Prichard proposes that even though corporations do not receive
any pecuniary benefit from the fraud, their agents may be motivated by fear, greed, and Pollyannaism.
96
Indeed, one commentator suggested that investors and their attorneys are the ones unjustly enriched by
the fraud, not the corporation. Langevoort, supra note 21, at 651. I would not go that far. The corporation does
receive some indirect benefits from the initial undiscovered fraud such as increased publicity, a higher share trading
price, and, for the individuals who commit fraud, temporarily increased job security.
97
In an auditor situation, Judge Posner noted that to assume that the corporation always benefits from the
fraud ignores the distinction between “fraud on behalf of a corporation” and “fraud against it.” Cenco Inc. v.
Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 1982). Judge Posner elaborates on this distinction, noting that
“[f]raud against the corporation usually hurts just the corporation; the stockholders are the principal if not only
victims.” Id. Defendants have attempted to employ this distinction in securities fraud cases by arguing that where
the corporation received no benefit it should not be held liable. This argument, however, has been rejected by at
least one court. See, e.g., In re Cylink Sec. Litig., 178 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1087-88 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
98
See, e.g., Plevy v. Haggerty, 38 F. Supp. 2d 816, 833 (C.D. Cal. 1998); Coffee, supra note 4, at 29
(“Typically, managers hide bad news because they fear loss of their jobs (either from a dismissal or a hostile
takeover), and they overstate favorable developments or inflate earnings in order to maximize the value of their
stock options and other equity compensation); Alexander, supra note 2, at 1498; Arlen & Carney, supra note 4, at
702-03.
99
These benefits could continue to provide increased revenues long after the litigation ends. Yet, even if a
court required a corporation to disgorge its unjust enrichment, Section 78bb(a)’s “actual damages” requirement may
limit the extent to which one could speculate about the fruits of fraud.
100
See, e.g., Plevy, 38 F. Supp. 2d at 833; Alexander, supra note 2, at 1498.
101
Alexander, supra note 2, at 1498.
102
In re Cylink Sec. Litig., 178 F. Supp. 2d at 1087-88.
103
Id. Ironically, the judge’s main concern was not whether corporations should be held vicariously liable
for the acts of their agents when their agents do not act in concert with or for the benefit of the corporation. Instead,
the judge was troubled that “[t]aking the corporation out of the class action for want of allegations of corporate
benefit might well endanger [corporate issuer and insurance proceeds as] sources of recovery.” Id.
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Even though Dura indicated that modern securities actions resemble common-law deceit
and misrepresentation actions, when awarding damages, courts should not ignore either the
absence of a contract or the other disparities between face-to-face and open market transactions.
Common law permitted disgorgement and recovery of benefit-of-the-bargain damages based on
contract law and unjust enrichment principles. But these principles do not apply to open-market
fraud because, apart from public offerings, the issuer is generally not the seller in a fraud-on-themarket case.104
II. NORMATIVE THEORIES SUPPORTING PRIVATE 10B-5 ACTIONS
Compensating the plaintiff class for more than its out-of-pocket loss in, for example, the
gold-platinum hypothetical, is problematic given the distinctions between common-law deceit
and misrepresentation actions on the one hand and fraud-on-the-market actions on the other.105
But, if compensating investors for more than their out-of-pocket losses fostered the goals of
private class action litigation, then proposing legislative and judicial reforms to facilitate
recovery might be a worthwhile endeavor. The corrective justice theory, upon which the idea of
compensation is based, posits that injustice occurs when one party realizes a gain and the other a
corresponding loss.106 Theoretically, the class action then corrects the injustice by depriving one
party’s gain and restoring it to the parties with the loss.107 But, because corporations do not
receive a direct gain from the agent’s fraud on the open market, it is implausible to contend that
the principal function of the class action is to correct justice by restoring lost compensation to
investors.108
A. Compensation as a Theoretical Rationale for Private Class Actions

104

Some commentators have gone further to argue that investors are not entitled to recover out-of-pocket
losses. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 21, at 639. Langevoort notes that a “full out-of-pocket compensation in
open-market cases is systematically excessive and dysfunctional, and not a system that a rational investor
considering the issue ex ante would want, much less demand.” Id. at 646.
105
See Coffee, Loss Causation After Dura: Something for Everyone, supra note 6, at 5 (“[C]ourts should
interpret loss causation to require a net stock market decline in the security’s price in order to preclude what I
termed ‘phantom losses.’ But the Court has not done that. Indeed, it has even suggested that new forms of phantom
losses may be recoverable.”).
106
Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice in a Nutshell, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 349, 349, 350 (2002); Gary
Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801,
1823 (1997) (noting corrective justice’s concern for compensating victims).
107
Weinrib, supra note 106, at 349. Weinrib observes, “A correlatively structured remedy responds to and
undoes an injustice only if that injustice is itself correlatively structured. In bringing an action against the defendant,
the plaintiff is asserting that the two are connected as doer and sufferer of the same injustice . . . . The law then
rectifies this injustice by reversing its active and passive poles, so that the doer of injustice becomes the sufferer of
the law’s remedy.” Although this rationale readily applies to face-to-face transactions, it is problematic as applied to
open market transactions for the same reasons that rescission and disgorgement are problematic. In this sense, the
securities fraud class action is likely more in line with the notion of distributive justice. See id. at 351. I would be
remiss in failing to point out that a wide divide exists between corrective justice scholars on the one hand and
utilitarian scholars on the other. See Jefferey O’Connoll & Christopher J. Robinette, The Role of Compensation in
Personal Injury Tort Law: A Response to the Opposite Concerns of Gary Schwartz and Patrick Atiyah, 32 CONN. L.
REV. 137, 139 (1999).
108
See Schwartz, supra note 106, at 1824 (“For the fundamental rule of vicarious liability, the deterrence
rationale gets the job done in a way that corrective justice does not.”).
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Perhaps ideally, the private securities class action would provide an efficient means for
obtaining financial relief for the wronged investor. Still, when the subject security’s value
appreciates after fraud (generating a value higher than what the investor paid for the security), as
in the gold-platinum hypothetical, the investor is already financially advantaged from owning the
security.109 Even absent this windfall, statistics show that securities class-action settlements
recover only a small amount of investor loss,110 and that approximately seventy-percent of
financial institutions with claims in settled securities class actions do not even submit them.111
One study estimated that institutional investors failed to collect approximately $1 billion a year
from securities class-action settlements.112 Statistics indicating that institutional investors are
indifferent to settlement funds weakens the corrective justice and compensation arguments in
favor of private class actions, especially where investors experienced no net loss from bundled
favorable and adverse information.113
Despite this evidence, compensation is often thought of as a reason to permit fraud-onthe-market actions by private plaintiffs.114 Therefore, this section analyzes theories that
undermine the compensation argument and observes that: (1) Congress did not enact securities
laws to provide investor insurance; (2) private securities class actions redistribute wealth
between diversified shareholders and leave no one better off except the attorneys; and (3)
109

Merritt Fox adopts the opposite view and thinks that the plaintiff has suffered a loss in some sense of the
word. He observes:
Assuming that she does not sell before full market realization of the true
situation, the defendant’s misstatement has made her worse off in an amount
equal to its inflation of purchase price. But for the misstatement, she would
have paid exactly that much less for the share, yet her return over her period of
ownership (however long, and from whatever mix of dividends, distributions
and sales proceeds that she receives) would have been just as great.
Fox, supra note 13, at 1553. Oddly, the U.S. government also took the position that this constitutes a loss. It
indicated that a price decline “may not be a necessary condition for loss causation, however, because the inflation
attributable to the fraud could be reduced or eliminated even if there were a net increase in price.” Amicus Brief for
the United States in Support of Petition for Cert. at 13, Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005), available
at 2004 WL 1205204 (May 28, 2004).
110
Investor losses continually exceed settlement values. Ronald I. Miller, Todd Foster, & Elaine Buckberg,
Recent Trends in Shareholder Class Action Litigation: Beyond the Mega-Settlements, is Stabilization Ahead?,
NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING 7 (April 2006) (on file with author).
111
Investor Protection: A Review of Plaintiffs’ Attorney Abuses in Securities Litigation and Legislative
Remedies: Hearing on H.R. 5491 Before the House Comm. on Financial Services and the Subcomm. On Capital
Markets, Insurance, and Government, 109th Cong. 2d Sess. (June 28, 2006) (testimony of James D. Cox); James D.
Cox & Randall Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers: Empirical Evidence and Legal Implications of
the Failure of Financial Institutions to Participate in Securities Class Action Settlements, 58 STAN. L. REV. 411
(2005) [hereinafter Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers]; James D. Cox & Randall Thomas, Leaving Money
on the Table: Do Institutional Investors Fail to File Claims in Securities Class Actions?, 80 WASH. U.L. Q. 883
(2002).
112
Cox & Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers, supra note 111, at 412; A.C. Prichard, Who
Cares?, 80 WASH. U. L. Q. 883, 883 (2002).
113
On average, only approximately 28% of eligible institutional investors file claims in class action
settlements. Cox & Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers, supra note 111, at 424.
114
Section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act contributes to this idea of compensation and courts readily
assumed that damages developed for common-law fraud face-to-face transactions also applied to open-market
transactions. Langevoort, supra note 21, at 645.
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compensating investors for their cognitive errors reduces incentives to learn and creates perverse
incentives to hold on to stocks that hint at fraud. Even though these observations apply to
securities class actions as a whole, my focus here is that the class action’s principal goal should
not be compensating investors when they suffered no out-of-pocket losses.
(1) Securities Laws Were Not Enacted to Provide Investor Insurance
Congress enacted the securities laws to promote integrity in the open market, not to
provide investor insurance.115 In fact, the loss causation element precludes securities laws from
becoming an insurance program for any security purchased in reliance on a misstatement –
regardless of whether the misstatement caused a change in value – by ensuring that the misdeed
actually caused the economic loss.116
To be sure, failing to disclose material information that artificially inflates the security’s
price harms the investor who purchases at that price and does not sell the security before the
corporation discloses adverse information. Nevertheless, investing in the stock market is an
inherently risky business, and the corporate defendant cannot return the illicit profit because the
seller – not the corporation – received it. In short, stock market investments should not be
treated as the equivalent of placing money in a risk-free federally insured savings and loan
plan.117 This is not to say that fraud should become another investment risk. Rather, when
misstatements do not cause the loss or the market simply is not as strong as predicted, the class
action should not function as a form of supplemental income. To minimize risk, investors can
insulate themselves from the effects of market downturns and fraud by diversifying their
portfolios.118 Thus, as set forth below, compensating investors for company-specific losses may
not be necessary.
(2) Private Actions Redistribute Wealth between Diversified Shareholders
It is often said that securities class actions are a zero sum game for diversified investors
and I will not attempt to rehash that literature here.119 I will, however, note that class actions
115

Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005) (“At the same time, allowing a plaintiff to forgo
giving any indication of the economic loss and proximate cause that the plaintiff has in mind would bring about the
harm of the very sort the statutes seek to avoid . . . . Such a rule would tend to transform a private securities action
into a partial downside insurance policy.”); Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 252 (White, J., joined by
O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995); Langevoort,
supra note 41, at 181 (“[T]here is very little reason to use the class action device as what is essentially an insurance
system against market mood swings.”).
116
Carlton v. Franklin, 1990 WL 116788, at *3 (4th Cir. Aug. 2, 1990).
117
See generally Brigden v. Scott, 456 F. Supp. 1048 (D.C. Tex. 1978) (likening plaintiffs who invested in
speculative real estate investments, received tax write-offs and benefits from the deal, and wanted rescission to
roulette players). There have been a number of arguments that the gambling industry and securities industry should
have similar regulation. See, e.g., Thomas Lee Hazen, Disparate Regulatory Schemes for Parallel Activities:
Securities Regulation, Derivatives Regulation, Gambling, and Insurance, 24 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 375, 395
(2005).
118
See generally Prichard, supra note 23, at 940-41 (“Holding a diversified portfolio effectively eliminates
any possibility of being a net loser from fraud on the market, thereby assuaging the concerns of even the risk-averse
shareholder.”).
119
See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 4, at 26; Langevoort, supra note 41, at 181 (“First, any award against the
issuer or settlement is funded directly or indirectly out of the issuer shareholders’ pockets, as the fraud-on-themarket litigation system is premised almost exclusively on a system of vicarious liability. Second, investors tend to
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cannot actually be a “zero sum” game when as much as thirty-percent of the recovery pays for
litigation costs.120 To explain, in open-market class litigation, a group of shareholders and former
shareholders who purchased the defendant corporation’s stock during the relevant “class period”
sues the corporation for a misstatement or omission even though the corporation itself has not
purchased or sold its securities.121 When the litigation settles (or a judgment is entered), the
corporation and thus, indirectly, its shareholders, bear the costs. Accordingly, securities class
actions in the open market produce a wealth transfer between shareholders who own stock in the
corporation and shareholders in the class.122
This is particularly true when an investor spreads the risk of loss by diversifying her
portfolio, minimizing the impact of a poor financial showing by any one company.123
Diversification increases the likelihood that an investor will be in both in the plaintiff-class suing
the corporation and in the shareholder group paying for the litigation.124 The more an investor is
diversified, the greater the likelihood that, on any given day, she will be a shareholder within the
class period or in the group indirectly funding the settlement. Consequently, even though
investors “win” on some days and “lose” on others, in the aggregate, they are essentially
transferring their wealth from one pocket to another.125 In sum, private securities class actions
appear to be a costly means for diversified investors to make wealth transfers to themselves (and
pay a substantial amount to their attorneys).126
In fact, the primary beneficiaries of private securities-fraud class actions appear to be the
attorneys.127 Transactional costs such as attorneys’ fees as well as settlement payments to
be, directly or indirectly, diversified in their investments and are just as likely to gain a windfall from issuer ‘fraudon-the-market’ as to end up a loser.”); Douglas M. Schwab et al., A Completely New Approach to Rule 10b-5
Damages, 1203 PLI/CORP. 347, 364-65 (2000); Prichard, supra note 23, at 938-39; Langevoort, supra note 21, at;
Alexander, supra note 2, at 1502.
120
Anjan V. Thakor et al., The Economic Reality of Securities Class Action Litigation, 3 (Oct. 26, 2005),
available at http://www.navigantconsulting.com/A559B1/navigantnew.nsf/vGNCNTByDocKey/PP6C93BCE4133/
$FILE/NCI-TheEconomicRealityofSecuritiesClassActionLitigation_10.26.05_.pdf (last visited June 30, 2006) (on
file with author).
121
Coffee, supra note 4, at 26.
122
Id.
123
Id.; Prichard, supra note 23, at 940-41.
124
Coffee, supra note 4, at 26. For example, say an investor focuses on the pharmaceutical industry and
compiles a diversified portfolio of stocks for the numerous companies within that industry. If consumers avoid
Merck’s painkiller, Vioxx, because of the ongoing class litigation, it does not mean that they will go without
painkillers and cause a downturn in the entire pharmaceutical industry. Rather, they will use a different painkiller.
An investor with diversified stocks within the pharmaceutical industry will suffer loss from the decrease in Merck’s
stock but a gain from the increase in sales from other companies’ painkillers. Thus, there is no net loss.
125
Coffee, supra note 4, at 26. For each shareholder who bought the stock at an artificially inflated price
due to fraud, another shareholder has sold. Alexander, supra note 2, at 1496. Thus, one particular buyer’s loss is
offset by the seller’s gain. If all investors are ignorant of the fraud and are diversified then there will be winners
with windfalls just as often as there are losers. Academics have continued to debate the effects of this circularity.
See, e.g. Arlen & Carney, supra note 4, at 698-700; Paul Mahoney, Precaution Costs and the Law of Fraud in
Impersonal Markets, 78 VA. L. REV. 623, 635 (1992).
126
Coffee, supra note 4, at 26; Arlen & Carney, supra note 4, at 700. A number of academics have
recognized the circularity of the private securities fraud class action among diversified investors. See, e.g.,
Alexander, supra note 2, at 1498-99; Arlen & Carney, supra note 4, at 698-700; Mahoney, supra note 125, at 635.
127
See Richard M. Phillips & Gilbert C. Miller, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995:
Rebalancing Litigation Risks and Rewards for Class Action Plaintiffs, Defendants and Lawyers, 51 BUS. LAW. 1009,
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investors frequently fall upon the corporation’s shareholders – often inequitably since the
shareholders engaged in no wrongdoing. Even the SEC recently indicated that it will consider
whether the violative conduct victimized shareholders when determining whether to impose
hefty financial penalties on the corporation.128 As Professor John Coffee argues, “[t]o punish the
corporation and its shareholders in [a typical secondary open-market case] is much like seeking
to deter burglary by imposing penalties on the victim for having suffered a burglary.”129 The
result is a net social gain that, if measured only by investor trading gains and losses, is zero.130
(3) Permitting Recovery beyond Out-of-Pocket Losses Reduces Incentives to Learn
Securities class actions not only operate as a costly means for wealth redistribution, but
may also have perverse incentives on investor motivation and education.131 Behavioral finance
theorists present some tentative answers to market phenomenon left unexplained by traditional
law and economics.132 They refute the assumption that investors are rational,133 yet it is not clear
1013 (1996); Arlen & Carney, supra note 4, at 700; cf Jonathan R. Macey & Jeffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’
Attorney’s Role in Class Actions and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform,
58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1991) (observing that plaintiffs’ attorneys may have divergent interests from the interests of
the class).
128
Press Release, Securities Exchange Commission, Statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission
Concerning Financial Penalties (Jan. 4, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-4.htm (last visited
July 4, 2006). The SEC observed:
In cases in which shareholders are the principal victims of the violations, the
Committee expects that the SEC, when appropriate, will seek penalties from the
individual offenders acting for a corporate issuer. Moreover, in deciding whether
and to what extent to assess a penalty against the issuer, the court may properly
take into account whether civil penalties assessed against corporate issuers will
ultimately be paid by shareholders who were themselves victimized by the
violations. The court also may consider the extent to which the passage of time
has resulted in shareholder turnover.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
129
Coffee, supra note 4, at 5.
130
Alexander, supra note 2, at 1496; Langevoort, supra note 21, at 646; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note
3, at 639.
131
As Langevoort notes, “[f]ew rational investors would opt for a system that so systematically
overcompensates when they know that investors generally will be funding those payments. And no rational investor
would opt for an expensive litigation system to accomplish it Langevoort, supra note 21, at 650.
132
Langevoort, supra note 41, at 153 (“One of the contributions of the behavioral finance research is that it
may help us explain otherwise puzzling marketplace behavior, even if it does not yield clear-cut answers on the
appropriate response.”). For background on the literature of behavioral finance, see SERSH SHEFRIN, BEYOND
GREED AND FEAR: UNDERSTANDING BEHAVIORAL FINANCE AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INVESTING, at Ch. 2 (2002);
BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000); Jonathan Klick & Gregory Mitchell, Governmental
Regulation of Irrationality: Moral and Cognitive Hazards, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1620 (2006), available at
http://www.law.umn.edu/uploads/images/3289/Mitchell__Klick_Final.pdf; Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Prichard,
Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 14 (2003); Ronald L. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight Bias, 28 J. CORP. L. 715 (2003); Langevoort,
supra note 41, at 135; Robert Prentice, Whither Securities Regulation? Some Behavioral Observations Regarding
Proposals for its Future, 51 DUKE L.J. 1397 (2002); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998).
133
Ribstein, supra note 6, at 138; Philip E. Tetlock & Barbara A. Mellers, The Great Rationality Debate,
13 PSYCHOL. SCI. 94 (2002). Numerous works explicate the particular biases that investors might be subject to. See
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how these insights relate to securities regulation.134 As Larry Ribstein observed, if markets are
not as efficient as once believed, then Congress may need to strengthen securities laws to provide
additional insulation from investor misjudgment – i.e., the paternalistic view of behavioral
economics.135 On the other hand, if “noise” moves markets instead of actual information, then
increased regulation and liability may lead to more harm.136 Ribstein identifies one of the
hazards related to class actions and notes that “[f]orcing corporations or insiders to pay damages
linked to the market’s irrational response to disclosures may have perverse effects, including
discouraging disclosure.”137
But discouraging disclosure may be even less problematic than diminishing individual
incentives to learn from past investment mishaps. Jonathan Klick and Greg Mitchell’s recent
research indicates that making the private class action available to defrauded investors even
where the investors experienced no out-of-pocket loss could reduce both their incentive to learn
and their ability to make future decisions.138 Klick and Mitchell argue that “moral hazards”
appear when paternalistic regulations – such as securities laws – reduce individual incentives to
act “deliberately and carefully.”139 Similarly, individuals face “cognitive hazards” when these
regulations restrict choices that might otherwise function as learning opportunities.140 But moral
and cognitive hazards do not exist solely in the vacuum of regulation. Plaintiffs’ attorneys’
intervention into investors’ lives may also restrict learning opportunities.
As we have seen, diversified investors, as corporate shareholders, fund a generous
portion of securities-fraud settlements.141 Thus, few fully informed investors would choose
expensive class litigation that essentially transfers wealth from one pocket to another.142 Yet,
behavioral finance indicates that human rationality is bounded and that decision-makers must
Choi & Prichard, supra note 132, at 7-15 (noting that the number of biases makes one wonder how investors are
ever able to make a positive market return); Dale Griffin & Amos Tversky, The Weighing of Evidence and the
Determinants of Confidence, 24 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 411 (1992) (overconfidence bias); Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Belief in the Law of Small Numbers, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 2324 (1982); Baruch Fischoff, Hindsight Is Not Equal to Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment
Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL: HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 288, 288 (1975) (hindsight
bias).
134
Ribstein, supra note 6, at 138; Langevoort, supra note 41, at 153 (“Lawyers and policy makers cannot
hope to resolve the academic dispute over market efficiency reflected in the foregoing finance scholarship.”).
135
Ribstein, supra note 6, at 138.
136
Id.; see generally J. Bradford De Long et al., Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets, 98 J. POL. ECON.
703 (1990).
137
Ribstein, supra note 6, at 138. Ribstein further observes that holding corporate agents liable for
misrepresentations may “increase investors’ tendency toward overconfidence by convincing them that securities
trading is safe, even if liability merely protects them only from a relatively narrow risk of misrepresentation.” Id. at
144.
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See Klick & Mitchell, supra note 132, at 1626.
139
Id.; see also Ribstein, supra note 6, at 145.
140
Klick & Mitchell, supra note 132, at 1626, 1633. Ribstein observes that the law may not have much
effect on learning if investors do not know how it protects them and points out that investors who do learn may be
replaced by a new naïve group. Ribstein supra note 6, at 145. Yet, this does not eliminate the potential perverse
effects of class litigation on investor learning.
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Prichard, supra note 23, at 958 (“The transaction costs of litigation leading to settlements that merely
transfer wealth among shareholders are a pure social waste, unless class actions provide a substantial deterrent
effect.”); Mahoney, supra note 125, at 636; Arlen & Carney, supra note 4, at 699-700.
142
See Langevoort, supra note 21, at 650.
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select among numerous demands for their time and attention.143 Consequently, investors are
“rationally ignorant,” possibly about the true litigation costs, because it is unreasonable, if not
impossible, to gather all relevant information before making a single decision.144 Because the
majority of non-attorney individuals do not have much information about the inner-workings of a
securities-fraud class action, they are (a) likely to take their attorneys’ advice and proceed with a
class action (and subsequent settlement) that they are inadvertently funding and (b) not likely to
distinguish between recoveries that are out-of-pocket versus those based on contract law
measurements, such as disgorgement or rescissory damages.145 Although legal education would
likely diminish this ignorance,146 it is extraordinarily unlikely that an investor would squander the
time, effort, and expense of a legal education just to determine whether a securities class action
makes economic sense.
Without a firm doctrinal statement on securities-fraud damages, the class action is
arguably available to investors, such as those in the gold-platinum hypothetical, who did not
experience a net loss. Because individuals “learn by doing,”147 compensating investors without
out-of-pocket losses not only prevents them from learning from their past investment mistakes
but provides a perverse incentive to ignore potential warning signs of future fraud in hopes of
receiving additional money in a class action.148 This, in turn, fosters rational ignorance and
rewards the investor who stays aboard the metaphorical sinking ship when other investors
heeded the warning signs long before. In short, if private litigation compensates investors
without out-of-pocket losses once, this could (1) prevent individuals from learning from their
investment mistakes and reward ignorance and (2) provide a perverse incentive to purposefully
invest in companies with signs of fraud with the hope that they will again receive a litigation
windfall.149
143

See ROBYN M. DAWES, RATIONAL CHOICE IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 50-56 (1988); Prentice, supra note
132, at 1454; Jolls et al., supra note 132, at 1471; Herbert A. Simon, Rational Choice and the Structure of the
Environment, 63 PSYCHOL. REV. 129, 129 (1956).
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See Prentice, supra note 132, at 1454. There have been a number of initiatives to make corporate
disclosures less dense and more useful through simplification. For example, before Congress passed the SarbanesOxley Act, SEC Chairman Pitt urged public companies to “consider simplifying financial disclosures to make
accounting statements useful to and utilizable by, ordinary investors.” Harvey L. Pitt, Remarks Before the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) Governing Counsel (Oct. 22, 2001), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch516.htm (last visited Aug. 7, 2006). Making financial disclosures easier to
read would certainly help in reducing the amount of information that investors might consider before investing. Yet,
even still, it would be difficult to read every company’s full disclosures before making a single investment decision.
145
See generally Ribstein, supra note 6, at 141 (“[I]nvestors are not equal in education, intelligence, or
expertise.”).
146
Cf Klick & Mitchell, supra note 132, at 1652 (arguing that education affects an individual’s chances of
picking the correct option).
147
Id. at 1626 (“[R]esearch from developmental psychology indicates that individuals improve their
decision-making skills over time through a ‘learning by doing’ process, and that paternalistic policies threaten
interference in this self-regulatory process.”).
148
Of course, this theory is not immune to the criticism that minimizing the incentive for private litigation
in certain circumstances is paternalistic in and of itself. Yet, a steadfast avoidance of all paternalistic initiatives
leads to a return to laissez-faire markets. See generally id. at 1653 (“Imposing no choice-set constraint or offering
no insurance would represent a laissez-faire stance in which there is no paternalistic oversight of the biased
behavior.”). Recall the stock market crash of 1929 and the Great Depression that followed, which counsels against
this approach to securities regulation.
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There might be an interesting if not persuasive defense here. If individual or even institutional investors
continually purchased securities that reeked of fraudulent behavior in hopes of obtaining a windfall recovery in a
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This leaves open the question of whether laws or judicially tailored recoveries should
“save investors from themselves.” Of course, taking away the choice to sue where investors
suffer no net loss can be seen as yet another paternalistic intervention. Given that congressional
members and judges also suffer from cognitive biases,150 the question that follows then is
whether an optimal level of paternalism exists and, if so, who is the administrator? This section
raises more questions that it does answers, but Klick and Mitchell offer some preliminary
observations on this point. They contend that “optimal paternalism represents a mechanism
design problem in which a social planner must consider using more than just the sledgehammer
of constraining choice sets ex ante or providing implicit social insurance through some form of
ex post paternalism.”151 Thus, if one considers the judiciary an apt social planner, then at least
one option is to negate social insurance by limiting investors to out-of-pocket losses in private
class actions. The corollary is then that the class action is not available to net winners from
fraud. Although arguably paternalistic, this option promotes investors’ incentives to learn from
their past investment errors and takes one opportunity for class litigation away – and with it the
perverse double-reward when the net stock price increases after fraud.
B. Private Class Actions Promote Deterrence
Because compensating defrauded investors without out-of-pocket loss encourages costly
wealth transfers between diversified investors and provides disincentives to learn, compensation
should not be the principal rationale underlying securities fraud class actions. Instead, in accord
with Congress’s goal of ensuring market integrity, private litigation’s primary objective must be
to deter fraud.152 The SEC commented that “the overriding purpose of Congress was not so much
to impose liability for the benefit of investors injured by a defective registration statement but

securities class action, the defendants could argue that the plaintiffs did not rely on the misrepresentation. Lack of
reliance has been a traditional defense in face-to-face transactions where reliance is unreasonable. See, e.g., Royal
Am. Managers, Inc. v. IRC Holding Corp., 885 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir. 1989). To make this argument in an open-market
case, the defendants would have to challenge the efficient market hypothesis, which is made easier by the large body
of literature on behavioral finance and noise traders. See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 6, at 138; Lynn A. Stout, The
Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635 (2003); J. Bradford De
Long et al., Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets, 98 J. POL. ECON. 703, 713 (1990).
150
See Charistopher R. Drahozal, A Behavioral Analysis of Private Judging, 67-SPG LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 105 (2004); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Symposium, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 NW.
U. L. REV. 1165, 1199-1201 (2003); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Symposium, Structuring Lawmaking
to Reduce Cognitive Bias: A Critical View, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 616, 630-31 (2002).
151
Klick & Mitchell, supra note 132, at 1653.
152
See Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 664 (1986); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406
U.S. 128, 151 (1972); Mahoney, supra note 125, at 636 (“Note that a redistribution among shareholders that does
not enhance deterrence is every bit as bad as fraud itself. Just as fraud may lead to investments in lying and
precautions so the possibility of using litigation as purely a redistributive tool will lead to excessive investment in
litigation.”); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70
VA. L. REV. 669, 693-94 (1984). The courts and the SEC generally interpret securities laws to maximize deterrence.
See Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. at 664; Affiliated Ute Citizens, 406 U.S. at 151 (“Congress intended securities
legislation enacted for the purpose of avoiding frauds to be construed ‘not technically and restrictively, but flexibly
to effectuate its remedial purposes.”).

25

rather to stimulate diligence on the part of those persons who are actually responsible for [its]
preparation.”153
Certainly, securities regulators want to deter the prospective practice of bundling adverse
and favorable information to prevent a stock price drop and thus potentially prevent class action
liability. And compensatory damages can, in certain circumstances, promote deterrence by
compelling officers and directors to internalize the costs and benefits of their actions.154 But,
since class recovery redistributes wealth between diversified shareholders and could cause
perverse effects on investor education and motivation, perhaps the class action is not the best
vehicle for deterring this type of bundling.155 One problem with using the class action to deter
this practice is that its uncertain damage measures may not accurately pair penalties with the
wrongful conduct’s social harm.156 Without a firm statement on how to measure potential
damages, both attorneys and corporate actors lack a defined starting point for calculating
financial costs.157 Thus, corporate actors have no gauge by which to judge detrimental effects of,
for example, overly optimistic announcements. Presumably, if this measurement is known, the
wealth-maximizing actor will avoid conduct that results in costly financial penalties and society
then benefits from accurate corporate information.158
Given the uncertainty of potential class action damages, how do corporate actors weigh
their behavior?
153

Brief for SEC as Intervenor, at 9-10 Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544
(E.D.N.Y. 1971).
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See generally STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 5-21, 127-50 (1987); Robert
Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523 (1984).
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See infra Part III.C.
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See generally Alexander, supra note 2, at 1493. This is not to say that uncertainty about how to measure
damages is the only problem. Market reaction is also unpredictable. But, a firm damage measure at least provides a
predictable starting point. Many commentators have explored ways in which the tort system does not lead to
optimal deterrence because of the transactional costs of litigation and the disparity between social and private
incentives. See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman & Mark Geistfeld, The Divergence Between Social and Private
Incentives to Sue: A Comment on Shavell, Menell, and Kaplow, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 483 (1987); Steven Shavell, The
Social Verses the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 333 (1982).
The deterrence theory is founded in the assumption that the officer or director is a rational actor and will
change her behavior based on the costs and benefits of a situation. Kevin M. Carlsmith, John M. Darley, & Paul H.
Robinson, Why Do We Punish? Deterrence and Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment, 83 J. PERSONALITY &
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 284, 285 (2002). Academics writing in the field of behavioral law and economics readily
dispute the theory that humans are rational. See, e.g., Choi & Prichard, supra note 132, at 1; James A. Fanto, QuasiRationality in Action: A Study of Psychological Factors in Merger Decision-Making, 62 OHIO ST. L. J. 1333, 1343
(2001); Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 778 (2001).
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I take for granted that corporate actors aim to maximize wealth. Of course, corporate actors may be
motivated by other factors such as saving their jobs or covering previous wrongdoing. Yet, corporations generally
hire managers to promote the corporation, to act in its best interests, and to make the corporation profitable. Thus, I
assume, perhaps naively, that managers generally want to act in their own best interests, which would include
keeping their jobs. Consequently, because part of their job is to maximize corporate profits, they must perform this
task to act in their own self-interest.
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Alexander, supra note 2, at 1493. Note that this assumes that corporate actors aim to maximize wealth.
This is not to say that corporate actors are not motivated by other factors. Indeed, corporate managers may be trying
to save their jobs or cover previous wrongdoing. But because managers are generally hired for their ability to
promote the corporation, I assume – perhaps naively – that managers generally want to act in the best interests of the
corporation so that, if nothing else, they can at least hold on to their jobs.
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(1) Maximizing Deterrence
Until would-be-violators can estimate how much a penalty might cost, they will be
unable to adjust their behavior accordingly.159 Put another way, if a would-be-violator feels that
she could face exorbitant penalties regardless of her actions – a quasi-form of strict liability –
then she may ignore potential penalties and engage in wealth-maximizing behavior.160 She may
then hope that the penalty costs less than the wealth received from that particular behavior.161
Wealth-driven corporate managers who contemplate violating the law must know the costs and
the benefits before they can determine whether the benefits outweigh the expected liability.162
But most private securities class actions end in confidential settlement agreements. Even those
that reach a judge or jury are subject to variable damages measures.163
Although most cases never reach a jury, if attorneys could advise would-be-violators and
would-be-litigants on the legal rule for awarding class damages, the rule could at least provide a
starting point for both groups to modify their behavior. Or, perhaps initially more likely, they
could agree upon a more realistic settlement value. John Calfee and Richard Craswell identified
“difficulty measuring damages” as among several pertinent factors that thwart optimal deterrence
in tort law.164 Calfee and Craswell discuss the fallacy that excessive damage awards incentivize
159

Erick Gerding explains the deterrence model from economic perspective as follows:
Were an economist to model the deterrence theory that undergirds the antifraud
rules of the securities law, the decision by a securities issuer or a market
intermediary (such as a gatekeeper) on whether to commit fraud would look
something like B < > Pd *((Pe * Ll) + Lr), where B represents the benefits to be
realized from committing fraud, Pd represents the probability of the fraud being
detected, Pe represents the probability of the securities laws being successfully
enforced, Ll represents legal liability under the securities laws, and Lr represents
market, reputational and other non-legal losses.
Rational actors contemplating violating the law will do so if the
benefits, B, outweigh the expected liability.
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See John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal
Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 966 (1984) (“If the legal standard is uncertain, even actors who behave ‘optimally’
in terms of overall social welfare will face some chance of being held liable because of the unpredictability of the
legal rule.”).
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know whether her comment or report will be considered “material.” See generally Gerding, supra note 159, at 43840; Alexander, supra note 2, at 1494 (“For example, a corporation will have difficulty weighing the costs and
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over-compliance with the law and, conversely, that insufficient awards prompt undercompliance.165 Instead, uncertainty about the measure and level of damages can produce both
under and over compliance (and under and over deterrence).166 To be sure, this is less than
idyllic when social planners aim for optimal deterrence and optimal paternalism.
(2) Preventing Substantive “Absolute” Liability and Promoting Predictability
The Dura Court’s dicta increased unpredictability in measuring damages by intimating
that a corporation might be liable in a class action when its higher share price is lower than it
would have been absent fraud. Unpredictability is evidenced by the increased likelihood that a
corporation may find itself in the midst of a securities class action at some point – perhaps
regardless of its precautions.167 In 2006, NERA Economic Consulting reported that over a fiveyear period, the average public company has a ten-percent probability that it will face at least one
shareholder class-action lawsuit.168 Although there is a forty-percent chance that the court will
dismiss the action,169 the mere filing of the suit typically causes a drop in a company’s stock
price.170
Because it often takes months to achieve a final dismissal with prejudice, the corporation
must report the litigation in its public SEC filings, which may decrease the willingness of new
investors to purchase its securities. As is oft mentioned in the ever-popular class action critique,
getting rid of even frivolous litigation is not free, particularly when the court is unable to
determine (due in part to the variable damage calculations) from the face of pleadings whether
the suit satisfies the pleading standards.171 If the complaint might eventually plead a prima facie

benefits of failing to disclose information if it is unsure about whether a court would consider that information
‘material.’”).
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Calfee & Craswell, supra note 161, at 986.
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Congress’ intent to permit private securities fraud actions for recovery where, but only where, plaintiffs adequately
allege and prove the traditional elements of causation and loss.” 544 U.S. at 346.
167
A.C. Prichard observes that if plaintiffs survive a motion to dismiss, then defendants usually settle
because it is cheaper than litigation. Prichard, supra note 23, at 952. I would extend this period beyond the motion
to dismiss stage and to the class certification stage. Defendants are generally willing to prolong the litigation if they
have a decent argument that the plaintiffs’ cannot meet the certification standards for Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23. Consequently, they will generally wait to settle until after the court certifies a class.
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Miller et al., supra note 110, at 3.
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Id.
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Coffee, supra note 4, at 5; Arlen & Carney, supra note 4, at 699 (“Revelation of the fraud, and of the
corporation’s prospective liability has an immediate impact on the price of the issuing corporations stock: the price
adjusts to reflect both the truth previously concealed by the fraud and the corporation’s expected liability for the
fraud.”).
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The Supreme Court observed in Dura that even though a plaintiff need only provide “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” “it should not prove burdensome for a plaintiff
who has suffered an economic loss to provide a defendant with some indication of the loss and the causal connection
that the plaintiff has in mind.” Dura, 544 U.S. at 346. Accordingly, it is not far-fetched to think that the Supreme
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case of fraud, the result is usually a dismissal without prejudice so that the plaintiffs can, if
possible, correct the deficiency. This invariably leads to amendments and re-filing, which starts
the cycle all over again. Clarifying that plaintiffs are entitled to recovery only their out-ofpocket losses could facilitate earlier dismissal of actions without net loss.
For now, the upshot of corporations experiencing at least a ten-percent probability of a
securities class action means that the officers and directors must plan for such an occurrence.172
The result is not overly cautious and pessimistic statements (for corporate agents would not last
long by failing to appropriately promote the corporation), but rather is a budgetary allocation for
officer and director insurance as well as for class-action litigation. When the judicial system
effectively holds defendants unconditionally liable by prompting them to build securities class
actions into their budget – regardless of whether they have committed fraud – then defendants
have little incentive to take excessive precautionary measures. If the funds (or the Directors and
Officers Insurance policies)173 are already available, what incentive does management have to be
more realistic in its financial reports?174 Though volatile market reactions generate a great deal
of uncertainty as well, a clear damage rule could facilitate earlier dismissal of suits without net
losses and give corporate planners at least some degree of predictability in calculating their
conduct in financial terms.175
III. LIMITING PRIVATE CLASS RECOVERY TO NET LOSSES
As espoused throughout this Article, one option for a doctrinal statement on damages in
the open market is to restrict plaintiffs’ recovery to out-of-pocket losses. This would provide
compensation only for net monetary losses.176 Although it seems relatively simple, this rule has
broader practical and theoretical ramifications. First, unlike other common-law remedies, the
out-of-pocket rule compensates plaintiffs only for the loss caused by the fraud and therefore
aligns with the stringent loss causation requirements and the limitation on “actual damages” in
28 U.S.C. Section 78bb(a).177 Second, it supplies a predictable foundation for judging the
reliability of expert methodology that purports to prove economic loss and injury.178 Third,
limiting plaintiffs to their out-of-pocket losses facilitates earlier dismissal of suits that provide
Court would encourage dismissal of claims that fail to demonstrate economic loss. The variable, of course, is how
that loss is measured.
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See Coffee, supra note 4, at 17.
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See id. at 19; Prichard, supra note 23, at 925 (“Directors’ and officers’ (“D&O) insurance pays a portion
of settlements and the corporation pays the remainder. Newer D&O policies reflect the company’s exposure by
providing coverage to the company as well as its officers. D&O insurance pays for settlements because a refusal to
pay could expose the insurer to potential liability for bad faith refusal to settle.”); Alexander, supra note 2, at 1497;
supra note 4 and accompanying text.
174
Granted, if the managers use their budgetary allocation for securities class action litigation then they will
have to replenish it so they do have some incentive to avoid fraud and prevent corporate loss. Yet, managers
without this sort of budgetary requirement at all might have greater incentives to avoid fraud.
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I recognize that limiting plaintiffs to out-of-pocket losses decreases the class action’s deterrence value as
applied to a corporation that attempts to avoid liability by bundling favorable and adverse information. There are,
however, other adequate means for deterring that situation. See infra Part III.C.
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This complies with Dura’s requirement that “a plaintiff . . . show not only that had he known the truth
he would not have acted but also that he suffered actual economic loss.” Dura, 544 U.S. at 343.
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See infra Part III.A.3.
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double-recoveries to investors and that create an incentive to invest purposefully in companies
showing signs of fraud.179 Finally, this limit could bolster the class action’s deterrence value
through increased predictability.180
A. Out-of-Pocket Losses Provide the Best Fit for Modern Securities Fraud
Restricting the plaintiff class’s recovery to its out-of-pocket loss recognizes that openmarket fraud is a tort and that the company is being held vicariously liable. Despite the
similarity of certain pleading requirements for both common law deceit and open-market fraud,
open-market securities fraud class actions differ factually in significant ways. In open market
transactions, there is typically no contract between the corporation and its public shareholders,
there is no privity between the nonissuing corporate defendant and the plaintiffs, and the
corporation does not receive a direct benefit from the fraud.181 Unlike other remedies that are
contract and equity-based, the out-of-pocket measure resonates with the realities of open-market
fraud.
(1) Out-of-Pocket Recoveries Comply with the Loss Causation Standard
The out-of-pocket measure also supports Dura’s strengthened loss causation requirement.
Despite its relative ambiguity, loss causation plainly mandates that plaintiffs tie the loss for
which they seek damages to the defendant’s misrepresentation or omission.182 It follows that, if
liable, defendants should compensate plaintiffs only for those losses. Consequently, a typical
rescissory measure of loss, which aims to restore the parties to the position they would have been
in absent the fraud, should not be available since it would require the defendant to reimburse the
plaintiff for losses caused by fraud and for losses caused by changes in the market.183
In the same manner, loss causation prevents unjust enrichment damages. In the goldplatinum hypothetical, the corporation’s stock price increased after the disclosure of no gold and
the announced discovery of platinum. Thus, the corporation arguably received an indirect
benefit from the platinum discovery.184 But the platinum discovery cannot enter the damage
equation because the defendant’s indirect profit from that discovery is unconnected to the
plaintiffs’ gold-related losses. Apart from a possible attempt to avoid liability by bundling
adverse and favorable news, there is no link between the stock price increase based on the
platinum discovery and the alleged decrease from the absence of gold. In other words, there can
be a lack of gold without the addition of platinum. A plaintiff is entitled to reimbursement only
179

See supra Part II.A.1.
See supra Part II.B.2. To be sure, it inhibits the class action’s ability to deter corporations from
bundling favorable and adverse information to avoid class action liability. But the SEC, Department of Justice, and
exchanges can still deter that type of behavior. See infra Part III.C.
181
See supra page 17 (discussing the indirect benefits that corporations may receive from undiscovered
fraud).
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15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4).
183
See Thompson, supra note 18, at 1180 n. 12. Note, however, that the defendant would only be
responsible for ninety days worth of changes since Congress had determined that this particular point in time is the
appropriate period for market adjustment. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e)(2) (2006).
184
See supra page 17 (discussing the indirect benefits that a corporation might receive from undiscovered
fraud)
180
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for loss caused by the misrepresentation or omission.185 Disgorgement is not an appropriate
remedy for that loss because disgorgement purges indirect benefits obtained by the corporation;
it does not award damages based on the loss caused by the misdeed.186 Moreover, where the
defendant would have obtained the benefit even without the fraud, disgorgement is not
appropriate.187 In short, even though Dura suggested that a plaintiff might bring an action when
a share’s higher price is lower than it would have been absent the fraud, a court should not
require the corporation to purge itself of any indirect benefits it obtained from its unrelated
positive news.188
(2) Out-of-Pocket Losses Conform with 28 U.S.C. § 78bb(a)’s “Actual Damages” Limit
Restricting plaintiffs to out-of-pocket recoveries also aligns with Section 78bb(a)’s
“actual damages” cap.189 This section’s language limits plaintiffs’ to “actual damages” caused by
the misdeed.190 Most courts construe this term to mean some form of economic loss and limit
awards to those that are strictly compensatory in nature.191 Accordingly, “actual damages” would
not include speculative lost profits from benefit-of-the-bargain or expectation damages.192
Some courts have, however, assessed rescissory damages even under the “actual
damages” theory by reasoning that this award must be “reduced by any value received as a result
of the fraudulent transaction.”193 The Supreme Court, in Randall v. Loftsgaarden, assumed,
because neither party challenged it, that rescissory recoveries could sometimes be proper for a
section 10(b) case.194 It thought that “in some circumstances” there was authority allowing the
section 10(b) plaintiff to choose between “undoing the bargain” or “holding the defendant to the
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Robbins v. Koger Props., Inc., 116 F.3d 1441, 1447 n. 5 (11th Cir. 1997).
Although, as I discussed above, the corporation may receive indirect benefits from the fraud. Yet, these
benefits are quite speculative and their value is probably a good bit less than losses of open-market purchasers
during that class period. Alexander, supra note 2, at 1498. Consequently, if the corporation has to compensate
investors for out-of-pocket losses, this should more than suffice to purge any indirect benefit.
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unjustly enriched? For an article suggesting the truth of this statement, see Langevoort, supra note 21, at 651.
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191
Pelletier v. Stuart-James Co., Inc, 863 F.2d 1550, 1557-58 (11th Cir. 1989); Jones v. Miles, 656 F.2d
103, 107 n. 8 (5th Cir. 1981).
192
Pelletier, 863 F.2d at 1557-58 (citing Wolf v. Frank, 477 F.2d 467, 478 (5th Cir. 1972)); Harris v. Am.
Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220 (8th Cir. 1975); Sound Video Unlimited, Inc. v. Video Shack, Inc., 700 F. Supp. 127
(S.D.N.Y. 1988).
193
Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 675 F.2d 168 (8th Cir. 1982).
194
478 U.S. 647, 661-62 (1986).
186

31

bargain by requiring him to pay [out-of-pocket] damages.”195
Yet, Loftsgaarden is
distinguishable for our purposes: it concerned a situation where privity of contract existed and
did not address an open-market context.
After the Court’s Dura decision, if presented with the issue of whether rescissory
damages are appropriate to remedy open-market fraud, the Court would likely decide that
defendants must reimburse plaintiffs only for economic losses actually caused by the misdeed.
This would effectually bar rescissory damages that compensate plaintiffs for non-fraud related
losses. Even if the “actual damages” language does not preclude rescissory damages, it seems
that loss causation, which requires a causal connection between the loss and the
misrepresentation or omission, would.196 Accordingly, the loss causation element and the “actual
damages” restriction confine litigants to recovery for their out-of-pocket losses.
(3) Proving Hypothetical Damages
Even though proving damages is never a simple endeavor, the out-of-pocket rule may
require less speculation than other measures. For any defrauded purchaser to recover, she must
establish the difference between the value of what she actually received and the value of what
she would have received absent the misrepresentation.197 In the gold-platinum situation, because
the stock price never actually declined, any damage calculation would have to be based on
speculation.198 Granted, assessing damages in that hypothetical would be somewhat easier
because both gold and platinum have a fixed market value. But this exercise becomes
increasingly difficult without fixed values. Any attempt to measure damages must isolate the
value of the misrepresentation (or omission) – i.e., the gold discovery – and remove from
consideration both the platinum announcement and any added value that could accrue from the
gold-platinum combination.
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Given the speculative nature of claims where no price decline occurs after a corporation
discloses a misrepresentation,199 the plaintiff class should put forth sufficient evidence of out-ofpocket loss in the complaint to survive a motion to dismiss.200 Expert testimony on class losses
would likely become a vital part of establishing plaintiffs’ prima facie case.201 But, even once a
court establishes that only out-of-pocket losses are compensable, there is no single universally
accepted expert model for proving these losses.202
The most typical model is the event study, which uses an expert to construct a “value
line” that theoretically represents the stock’s “true value” if purchasers knew the undisclosed
information on each day of the class period. Then, in theory, the expert can assess individual
loss for each class member by comparing the price actually paid with the value line construct.203
Because investors often buy and sell shares within the class period, the methodology for
assessing loss should account for in-and-out traders and provide a mechanism to net their
windfalls against their losses to determine net loss.204
199

Claims where the stock price did not actually decline are speculative because the lack of a decline could
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that they relied on a “material misrepresentation,” and could not plead a prima facie case of securities fraud.
200
See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342 (2005); see also In re Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d
1006 (9th Cir. 2005); cf Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 126 S.Ct. 1991, 2002 (2006) (“Certainly the plaintiff in
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The second step is to determine the aggregate damages of the class. To
determine per-share damages, an expert economic witness constructs a “value
line” which represents the “true value” of the stock – what purchasers would
have been willing to pay if they had known the undisclosed information – on
each day of the class period. The damages sustained by any particular member
of the class can then, in theory, be determined by comparing the price actually
paid with the value line for the date of the transaction.
Id. at 1491.
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Despite widespread use of the event study to demonstrate market reaction, the study can
show only that the market reacted to the disclosure; it cannot prove why.205 Even experts relying
on the same data and facts often present competing inferences regarding the amount of harm.206
Add to this an extended period between the misrepresentation and the disclosure – as was the
case in Dura207 – and there is an increased potential for non-related events to affect the market
price.208 Loss causation requires plaintiffs to demonstrate a causal connection between the
misrepresentation (or omission) and the economic loss.209 Assuming liability, it follows that
defendants have to compensate plaintiffs only for economic losses caused by the fraud.
Accordingly, courts must take precautions to ensure that experts’ methods extract non-related
factors affecting price from their calculation.210
Emerging Judicial Hostility to the Typical Damages Model Employed by Plaintiffs in Securities Class Action
Lawsuits, 56 BUS. LAW. 483 (2001). Alessi observes that the Proportional Decay Model does not account for in-andout purchasers and has thus been subject to Daubert scrutiny. Id. at 489-90.
Daniel Fischel and David Ross’s research provides some indicia of how important it is to take in-and-out
purchasers into account when calculating damages. In one particular case, hey observed that “many of these
institutions were ‘out-and-in’ during 1990: these institutions sold approximately 14 million shares [23% of the 60
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retained shares were retained by shareholders who were not out-and-in.” Daniel R. Fischel & David J. Ross, The
Use of Trading Models to Estimate Aggregate Damages in Securities Fraud Litigation: A Proposal for Change, in
SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS: ABUSES AND REMEDIES 135, 138 (National Legal Center for the Public Interest 1994).
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The primary means for ensuring that experts isolate damages caused by fraud is the Daubert analysis.
Whenever plaintiffs use experts to demonstrate injury and economic loss, courts should test the method using the
Daubert factors. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509
U.S. 579 (1993). For additional information on how courts conduct the Daubert analysis, see L. Elizabeth
Chamblee, Comment, Between “Merit Inquiry” and “Rigorous Analysis”: Using Daubert to Navigate the Gray
Areas of Federal Class Action Certification, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1041, 1051-54 (2004). If plaintiffs use expert
evidence to counter a motion to dismiss alleging that they either lack standing or failed to state a claim because they
suffered no economic loss, then the court should conduct a Daubert test (even at this early stage) to probe the
expert’s methodology and validity. A motion opposing class certification or a motion for summary judgment may
also present this issue. Issues of standing or failure to state a claim for lack of economic damages might appear in a
motion opposing class certification in the form of a challenge to the adequacy of the representative under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23. As I have argued elsewhere, courts should use Daubert earlier in the litigation process
to help determine whether plaintiffs have plead their prima facie case. Chamblee, supra, at 1041. The monetary
amount may, because of various court rulings, change throughout the course of litigation. But the expert’s method
and plaintiffs’ complaint should demonstrate that, if true, that plaintiffs suffered an economic injury. The court
should then dismiss the action if (1) plaintiffs’ complaint fails to allege that they suffered an out-of-pocket loss
where plaintiffs were net losers from the fraud or (2) plaintiffs’ expert’s method – not amount – of calculating
damage cannot survive a Daubert inquiry.
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B. Earlier Dismissal of Suits Providing Double Recovery
Though exact measures of loss generally come at the end of litigation, the calculation
method is important at the outset to determine whether plaintiffs’ experienced a net economic
loss for purposes of pleading a prima facie case of securities fraud.211 It is axiomatic that
plaintiffs must have an injury (an economic loss) before they can sue. As noted at the outset of
this Article, Congress passed the PSLRA, in part, to facilitate earlier dismissal of securities class
actions that do not plead a prima facie case. But, without a doctrinal statement limiting
plaintiffs’ compensation to their out-of-pocket losses, courts are often unable to determine from
the initial pleadings whether plaintiffs’ suffered compensable losses.
The important consideration in assessing loss is not the monetary amount, which will
fluctuate based on rulings regarding the class period and in-and-out purchasers, but the method.
The methodology should account for in-and-out traders and provide a mechanism to net
plaintiffs’ windfalls against their losses to determine net loss.212 The pivotal question is then:
assuming that everything in the plaintiffs’ complaint is true and that the expert’s method for
calculating out-of-pocket loss is sound, did these plaintiffs experience a net loss?
If the answer to that question is “no,” then, when the defendant files a motion to dismiss
based the plaintiffs’ failure to state a claim, the court should consider dismissal. Granted, if the
pleading error is an oversight and the possibility of compensable loss exists, then the court could
either dismiss the action without prejudice and permit plaintiffs to correct the error or give
plaintiffs leave to amend the complaint. But if, according to the stated facts in the complaint,
plaintiffs could not establish a net loss under the out-of-pocket rule, then the court should dismiss
the action with prejudice.
Increasing dismissals for cases without out-of-pocket loss accomplishes several goals.213
First, it helps ensure that the damages roughly approximate the true financial harm of the
violation.214 Second, if damage awards compensate only out-of-pocket loss, courts may dismiss
211
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The social costs are a different story. Fraud, even when it ultimately makes investors wealthier, harms
the market’s integrity. But there are other mechanisms for deterring fraud besides the class action. These
alternatives are increasingly important where investors do not suffer an economic loss.
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securities class actions that present a potential double-reward for investors who have not
experienced a true net loss. Third, compensating investors for only their out-of-pocket losses
alleviates – but does not eliminate – the problem that securities class actions generally
redistribute wealth among diversified shareholders. Finally, limiting recovery in this manner
gives both parties’ guidance about value when negotiating settlements. If a corporate defendant
feels it has a fair chance of dismissal, then it may feel less pressure to settle early in the
litigation. Similarly, plaintiffs’ attorneys who are paid on a contingency fee basis are less likely
to bring certain actions if they know that a court will not compensate plaintiffs with net gains.
C. Optimizing Deterrence through Increased Predictability
Reimbursing only out-of-pocket loss may also bolster the class action’s ability to deter
fraud. Because “unpredictable damages” is one of the factors that undermines optimal
deterrence,215 a doctrinal statement that plainly confines plaintiffs to an out-of-pocket recovery
could increase deterrence by increasing predictability. This restriction also improves deterrence
by making it easier for judges to determine when to dismiss actions that do not allege
compensable economic loss, as defined by the out-of-pocket standard.
Admittedly,
unpredictability also comes from uncertain market reaction to fraud and from variable expert
calculation methods. Predicting damages when a corporation is trying to gauge the economic
harm of issuing a restatement is almost impossible given the impulsive nature of market reaction.
Still, in formulating a worst-case scenario, the certainty of knowing how a court will calculate
loss and award damages helps. Even though setting a fixed method for assessing loss does not
ameliorate problems with unpredictability, it does offer parties a predictable and reliable starting
point for calculating potential damage awards.
Moreover, if we assume that corporate actors aim to maximize wealth and that they
weigh their behaviors to determine which attributes are the most cost-effective, then they can
adjust their behavior accordingly if the financial costs are known. This idea may assume too
much given that plaintiffs often bring securities class actions based on significant market
fluctuations rather than firm knowledge of corporate wrongdoing. Of course, social planners
could also manipulate other variables to increase deterrence. Although each of these variables
could merit its own law review article, collectively, they might include defining actionable
conduct, making a sanction a predictable consequence of wrongful conduct, targeting sanctions
at wrongdoers rather than at corporations, and providing specific guidelines for when sanctions
might be imposed. Suffice it to say that, for our purposes, a doctrinal statement for awarding
fraud-on-the-market damages will at least provide the start of increased predictability (and thus
increased deterrence) even though it will not, on its own, produce optimal deterrence.
Because the securities class action functions to deter fraud, one of the primary concerns
about limiting the class action’s availability to those who experienced a net loss is that corporate
wrongdoing could go undeterred. Yet, alternative enforcement means, such as the Department of
Justice, the exchanges, and the SEC, also deter fraud. Because most antifraud enforcement
efforts do not come from private class actions, statistics suggest that limiting the availability of
215
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private class actions when investors do not experience a net loss does not mean that fraud will go
undeterred or unpunished.216
Statistics show that the exchanges, Department of Justice, and the SEC – not private class
actions – already carry out most enforcement and deterrent efforts.217 From 2000 to 2002, private
plaintiffs initiated an average of only 205 securities class actions versus 5,101 actions initiated
by the SEC, Department of Justice, States, National Association of Securities Dealers, and the
New York Stock Exchange.218 Further, as compared with the average from 2000-2002, the 2005
statistics indicate that SEC enforcement actions increased and private actions decreased.219 In
2005, the SEC initiated 630 actions, which is a significant increase compared with the average of
528 from 2000-2002.220 Moreover, class action filings decreased from 247 in 2004 to 209 in
2005.221
All in all, these statistics demonstrate that corporate fraud will not go unpunished or
undeterred if plaintiffs cannot bring a class action when they do not experience a net monetary
loss. Unlike in private securities class actions, the SEC need not prove damage, injury
(economic loss), or reliance in order to maintain an enforcement action.222 Consequently, the
SEC’s enforcement and deterrence efforts would not be affected by limiting private class actions
to net losers who experienced out-of-pocket losses from the fraud. Thus, enforcement
mechanisms exist to deter even the situation presented by the gold-platinum hypothetical where
the share’s higher price was lower than it might otherwise have been absent the fraud.
Accordingly, social planners should consider limiting the securities class action’s availability to
investors who experienced out-of-pocket losses. This could result in at least a small measure of
increased predictability and could bolster the private securities class action’s deterrence value of
traditional fraud that causes a stock price decline.
CONCLUSION
My intention in this Article is not to imply that simply limiting investors to their out-ofpocket losses will provide a quick “fix” for the ills of the securities class-action system. Instead,
I hoped to highlight some of the intrinsic problems that could result from compensating investors
with a net gain and from stretching traditional common-law remedies to fit modern securitiesfraud class actions. Indeed, the out-of-pocket measure is the only common-law remedy that
recognizes the distinctions between face-to-face transactions and open-market fraud, that
216
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complies with the loss causation requirement, and that limits plaintiffs to their actual damages.
Restricting investors to out-of-pocket losses also advances optimal deterrence by increasing
predictability through a clear doctrinal damage calculation. Although experts will often differ
over methodologies,223 identifying the appropriate damage measure at least provides a predictable
starting point. Consequently, if the post-Dura courts encounter their own variation of the goldplatinum hypothetical, I am cautiously optimistic that they might consider the broader
consequences of compensating investors for more than their out-of-pocket losses and limit
damage awards accordingly.
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